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The Medium Run 
MACROECONOMICS  iS  largely  divided  into two  subfields.  One  focuses 
on the short run, on the study of business  cycles.  The other focuses  on 
the long run, on growth and its determinants. The assumption implicit 
in this division  is that the medium run is primarily a period of transition 
from business cycle fluctuations to growth. This simplification is clearly 
convenient,  but it is misleading.  Modern economies  are characterized 
by medium-run evolutions  that are quite distinct  from either business 
cycle  fluctuations or steady-state  growth. 
Two  facts  make the point.  The first is well  known: unemployment 
rates have steadily increased in continental Europe over the past twenty- 
five years, while remaining largely stable in "Anglo-Saxon"  countries. 
The other is less well known but equally important: capital shares have 
steadily increased in continental Europe over the past fifteen years, and 
in  many  cases  currently  stand at postwar  highs;  in contrast,  capital 
shares have remained largely stable in "Anglo-Saxon"  countries.  The 
latter fact plays a central role in the story that follows  and is documented 
in figure 1. The upper panel shows the behavior of capital shares in the 
business  sector in Germany,  France,  Italy,  and Spain.  Note that after 
lows in the late 1970s and early 1980s,  shares in all four countries stand 
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Figure 1. Capital  Shares, Continental  and "Anglo-Saxon"  Countries,  1970-96a 
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Source: Author's calculations, based on data from the Organisation  for Economic Co-operation and Development's data 
diskette OECD Business Sector Data Base, 1997/1. 
a. Sample period  ends in 1996 for Canada,  Germany,  and the United States;  for all other  countries,  in 1995. 
b. All income is ascribed to either capital or labor, so that capital income includes profits, interest paid by firms, and profit 
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at high levels  today.  The average share stood at 41 percent in 1995,  up 
from a low  of  31 percent in  1981  and a value  of  34 percent in  1970. 
The  lower  panel  shows  the  behavior  of  shares  in the United  States, 
Canada, and the United Kingdom.  Note that, in contrast to continental 
Europe, capital shares in those countries have remained stable.  In par- 
ticular,  in the United  States the old stylized  fact of a constant capital 
share still largely  holds true. 
This paper offers  the following  integrated explanation of these two 
facts.  The countries  of  continental  Europe were affected  by large ad- 
verse shifts in "labor supply"  during the 1970s.  Specifically,  the wage 
required by workers at a given rate of unemployment and a given level 
of  total factor productivity  increased.'  The causes  of these  shifts,  al- 
though not investigated  here,  have been the subject of much research 
by  others.  There  is  wide  consensus  that these  shifts  came  from  the 
failure of wages to adjust to the productivity slowdown  and the adverse 
supply  shocks  of  the  1970s.  In  any  case,  their  initial  effect  was  to 
decrease  profit rates and capital  shares.  Over time,  firms reacted  by 
moving away from labor, leading to a steady increase in unemployment, 
a recovery,  and even  an increase in capital shares. 
In most Continental countries,  labor supply shifts have substantially 
decreased,  if not vanished.  But since the early  1980s,  their labor mar- 
kets  have  been  characterized  by  adverse  shifts  in  "labor  demand." 
Specifically,  the real wage offered by firms at a given  ratio of labor to 
capital  and a given  level  of  total  factor productivity  has decreased.2 
There are two  potential  explanations  for this  decrease.  The  first is  a 
shift in the distribution of rents from workers to firms. The second  is 
technological  bias:  at given  factor  prices,  firms have  been  adopting 
1. Two semantic issues arise here. First, as my definition  of a labor supply shift 
indicates, I do not take "labor supply" necessarily  to mean competitive  labor supply, 
but rather (and more generally), the relation between the wage and unemployment 
implied by wage-setting in the labor market. Other  researchers  have variously called 
this  the wage curve, the wage-setting  relation,  or the pseudo-labor-supply  curve. Second, 
in order  not to have labor supply and labor demand  shift along a steady-state  growth 
path, I look at the wage adjusted  for total factor productivity.  Thus a slowdown in 
productivity  growth  that is not fully reflected  in a parallel  slowdown of real wages-at 
a given rate  of unemployment-shows up as a labor  supply  shift. 
2.  Again, by "labor  demand"  I do not necessarily  mean  competitive  labor  demand, 
but rather,  the relation  between the real wage and employment  that emerges from the 
employment  and pricing decisions of firms. This is sometimes  called the price-setting 
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technologies  that use  less  labor and more capital,  thus decreasing  the 
marginal  product of  labor  at a  given  ratio of  labor to  capital.  It  is 
difficult to distinguish  empirically  between  these two explanations  on 
the basis  of  aggregate  evidence;  to the extent that it speaks,  this evi- 
dence weakly favors the second.  Whatever the cause,  the effect  of this 
adverse shift in labor demand has been to increase unemployment  fur- 
ther, while  at the same time increasing capital shares. 
By  contrast,  the  "Anglo-Saxon"  countries  appear to  have  been 
largely shielded  from both the adverse labor supply shifts of the 1970s 
and the labor demand shifts of the 1980s and 1990s.  This accounts for 
the differences  from the Continental countries  in the evolution  of  un- 
employment  and of capital shares. 
While  it is true that the macroeconomic  literature has not typically 
focused  on medium-run evolutions,  this is not the first attempt to ex- 
plore such issues.  Michael  Bruno and Jeffrey Sachs told the first half 
of  the  story,  showing  how  the  failure  of  wages  to  adjust to  lower 
productivity growth and other adverse shocks could explain the rise in 
unemployment  in  the  1970s.3  The  present  paper can  be  seen  as  an 
update,  emphasizing  the  role  of  labor demand  shifts  since  the  mid- 
1980s.  One  of  the purposes  of  the project led by Jacques Dreze  and 
Charles Bean in the  1980s  was to identify  the role of capital accumu- 
lation in the rise of European unemployment,  a theme closely  related 
to that discussed  here.4 More recently,  Edmund Phelps has argued that 
the rise in European unemployment  is best understood as a "structural 
slump"  distinct from business  cycle  fluctuations.5 Finally,  the present 
paper is  closely  related to the recent work of  Ricardo Caballero  and 
Mohamad Hammour.6 Their analysis  of  the effects  of  specificity  and 
labor market institutions on capital accumulation and unemployment- 
in particular, their explanation of "jobless  growth"  in France-can  be 
seen as providing some of the microeconomic  foundations for the shifts 
that I take instead as primitives. 
The paper is organized  as follows.  With an eye on the evolution  of 
capital  shares,  the  first section  documents  the  evolution  of  capital, 
employment,  and wage and profit rates since  1970 in fourteen member 
3.  Bruno  and Sachs (1985). 
4.  Dreze and Bean (1990). 
5.  Phelps (1994). 
6.  Caballero  and Hammour  (1998). Olivier  J. Blanchard  93 
countries  of  the Organisation  for Economic  Co-operation  and Devel- 
opment (OECD).  It starts from the basic proposition that under Harrod- 
neutral progress,  there should be a close  relation between  the ratio of 
the profit rate to the wage  rate (measured in efficiency  units) and the 
ratio of  labor (measured  in efficiency  units) to capital.  It then shows 
that much of the increase in the ratio of the profit rate to the wage rate- 
and by  implication,  much  of  the  increase  in  capital  shares-in  the 
Continental countries over the past fifteen years does not reflect corre- 
sponding  movements  in relative  factor quantities.  I suggest  three po- 
tential explanations  for this divergence.  The first is that there are long 
lags in the adjustment of factor proportions to factor prices,  and one is 
still seeing the dynamic effects of the earlier adverse labor supply shifts. 
The  other  two  explanations  start from  the  premise  that the  relation 
between  factor prices and factor quantities has genuinely  shifted.  The 
second explanation  attributes the shift to changes in the distribution of 
rents from  workers  to  firms.  The  third attributes it to  technological 
change biased against labor. 
To explore the logic  and the role of these potential explanations,  the 
second  section  develops  a simple  model  of  employment  and capital 
accumulation.  Firms are assumed to be monopolistically  competitive. 
There are costs  to adjusting capital,  as well  as to adjusting the ratio of 
labor to capital.  Labor supply is upward sloping: the wage is a decreas- 
ing function  of the unemployment  rate. The interest rate is given  and 
independent of capital demand. That model makes clear how an adverse 
labor supply  shift  leads  first to  a decrease  and then to an increase- 
above its initial level  if the elasticity  of substitution between labor and 
capital is greater than one-in  the capital share, and to a steady increase 
in the unemployment  rate.  It also  shows  how  adverse  shifts  in labor 
demand,  whether caused  by  a shift  in the distribution of  rents or by 
technological  bias  against  labor,  lead to increases  in both unemploy- 
ment and the capital share. 
The third section  explores  how well  the model can explain the evo- 
lution of a particular country.  Relying  on my comparative advantage, 
I focus  on the evolution  of  France since  1970.  I construct  series  for 
shifts in labor supply,  labor demand,  and the user cost.  Taking those 
shifts as primitives,  I simulate the model.  The simulations  show  how 
the shifts can explain the evolution  of the ratio of labor to capital,  the 
capital  share,  and unemployment.  It would  be  overambitious  at this 94  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
stage of the research to try to explain the evolution  of each individual 
country. But I perform the same exercise  mechanically for each country 
and give  a short assessment  of the results. 
Having  shown the logic  of the argument, I return to econometrics. 
In the fourth section  I look for evidence  of lags in the response of the 
ratio of labor to capital to real wages.  I find evidence  of long lags.  But 
even  allowing  for such  lags,  there is  substantial evidence  of  adverse 
shifts  in  labor  demand  in  the  Continental  countries  since  the  early 
1980s. 
In the  fifth  section  I try to  determine  whether  the  shifts  in  labor 
demand reflect biased  technological  progress or changes  in the distri- 
bution of  rents.  The empirical  strategy is simple.  Shifts  in the distri- 
bution of rents should not affect the production function,  bias in tech- 
nological  change should be reflected in shifts in the production function. 
However,  estimating  production functions  is tricky,  and the empirical 
evidence  speaks  only  weakly.  Point  estimates  suggest  technological 
bias,  but they are not tight. 
I conclude  with a discussion  of open issues,  including the sources of 
the shifts  in labor supply  and demand,  the sources  of differences  be- 
tween  the experiences  of  Continental  and "Anglo-Saxon"  countries, 
and the relation (if any) of the shifts discussed  here to shifts in relative 
labor demand between  skilled  and unskilled  workers. 
Factor Prices and Factor Quantities 
Movements  in the capital  share,  such  as those  documented  in fig- 
ure 1, are not a puzzle in and of themselves.  Changes in factor propor- 
tions lead to changes  in factor prices (and vice  versa) and-unless  the 
elasticity  of substitution between capital and labor is equal to one-to 
changes  in shares.  Thus a natural first step is to see  whether one can 
account for the evolution of factor prices-and  by implication,  of factor 
shares-by  the evolution  of factor quantities. 
The following  benchmark is useful.  Suppose that output is a constant 
returns to scale function of labor and capital. Suppose that technological 
progress is Harrod-neutral, a natural benchmark, as this is the assump- 
tion necessary  for balanced growth.  Then one can write output, y,  as Olivier J. Blanchard  95 
y  =  y(zn,  k), 
where n is labor, k is capital,  and z is the level  of productivity.  Rede- 
fining labor in efficiency  units (that is,  adjusting for the level  of  pro- 
ductivity)  one can rewrite the production function as 
y  =  y(fi,  k), 
where  fi  zn. 
Under the further assumption  that the marginal product of  labor is 
equal to the wage,  the following  relation holds: 
where  ar  is the profit rate (that is,  profit divided by the capital stock in 
volume)  and wv- w/z is the wage rate per efficiency  unit. Furthermore, 
g'  is greater than zero: an increase in the ratio of labor to capital both 
increases  the profit rate and decreases  the wage,  and by  implication, 
increases  the ratio of  the profit rate to the wage.  If,  for example,  the 
production function exhibits a constant elasticity  of substitution (CES), 
the relation specified  in equation  1 is log linear, with coefficient  equal 
to  1/U, where  u  is  the elasticity  of  substitution  between  capital  and 
labor. 
A simple exercise  following  from this is to examine empirically  the 
relation between  the left-  and right-hand sides of equation  1. One can 
then ask: what is the implied elasticity  of substitution between capital 
and labor? Can an elasticity  different from one explain the evolution  of 
capital  shares  in Continental  countries  in the  1980s?  Or was  there a 
shift  in the relation  between  the factor price  and the factor quantity 
ratios during that period? 
I perform this exercise  for fourteen  OECD countries.  For most  of 
the analysis  below,  I divide  these  into two  groups: the first includes 
Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark, France, Germany,  Ireland, It- 
aly, the Netherlands,  Spain, and Sweden; the second includes Canada, 
the United Kingdom,  and the United States.  I refer to these,  with some 
license,  as  the  Continental  and  the  Anglo-Saxon  countries,  respec- 
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evolution of capital shares. Typically,  the period covered runs from the 
late 1960s to  1995,  depending on data availability.7 
Throughout the paper, the main data source is the OECD data set for 
the business sector in each country.8  Value added is net of indirect taxes 
and is  allocated  either  as labor income  or as capital  income.9  Labor 
income  includes  the  imputed  income  of  self-employed  individuals, 
based  on the average  wage  in the business  sector; capital  income  in- 
cludes  the residual income  of the self-employed.  Employment is mea- 
sured as the number of workers,  without adjustment for hours worked 
(so  that given  the  decline  in hours per worker,  employment  growth 
typically  is  overstated  and productivity  growth understated).  I make 
one  modification  to  the  data.  The  OECD  data  are adjusted  for  the 
number of  unpaid family  workers,  who  must be deducted  from total 
private employment  because  their output is not measured.  When this 
adjustment does  not start at the beginning  of the sample,  I extend it to 
earlier years,  assuming  a ratio of  unpaid family  workers to total em- 
ployment  equal to that in the first year for which it is available. '0 
7.  For Germany,  OECD  data  refer  to West Germany  up to 1990 and to Germany  as 
a whole after 1990. Although  it turns  out not to make  much  difference,  the econometric 
work below does not use the post-1990 data. Moreover,  I have excluded a number  of 
OECD countries  from this study, for various  reasons. Some-such  as Luxembourg,  or 
Norway at the beginning of the sample-are  small or have idiosyncratic  economic 
structures.  Some-especially  the more recent members, such as Greece, Turkey, and 
Mexico-are  at a different  level of development.  Portugal  shows a permanent  decrease 
in the measured  capital share by  15 to 20 percent of GDP around  the time of  its 
revolution;  while this fact is fascinating, I do not know how to interpret  it. A similar 
problem  of interpretation  arises with Japan, which shows a very large permanent  de- 
crease in the measured  profit  rate in the 1970s. 
8.  Organisation  for Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  data  diskette  Business 
Sector Data  Base,  1997/1. 
9.  Note that capital income here is different  from corporate  profits;  in particular,  it 
includes interest payments  by firms, as well as profit  taxes. The decrease in nominal 
interest  rates has increased  measured  corporate  profits since the early 1980s in many 
countries;  see Poterba  (1998) for a discussion  of the evolution  of corporate  profits  in the 
United States. But this decrease  has had no direct impact  on the measure  that I use. 
10. In a parallel  study, Dale Jorgenson,  Eric Yip, and I use the data  constructed  by 
Dougherty  and Jorgenson  (1996) for the G7 countries, for the period 1960-89. While 
the methodology  used to construct  measures  of capital  and labor  is quite different  from 
that underlying  the OECD data, the main conclusions reached  below also hold for the 
G7 data set. For France, a study by Cette and Mahfouz  (1996) of the statistical  issues 
associated with the measurement  of shares yields an evolution of the capital shares in 
the business  sector, in the corporate  sector, and in the nonfinancial  corporate  sector  very 
similar  to that  based on the OECD  data  for the business sector share. Olivier J. Blanchard  97 
Under the  assumption  that labor is  paid its  marginal product,  one 
can construct  the series  for Harrod-neutral technological  progress,  z, 
by  constructing  the  Solow  residual  for each  year,  dividing  it by  the 
contemporaneous  share of labor, and integrating it over time. Then one 
can construct  labor in efficiency  units by multiplying  employment  by 
the constructed z, and the wage  in efficiency  units by dividing  the real 
product wage (the wage divided by the deflator for business sector GDP) 
by z. 
Figure 2 plots the evolution of average factor price ratios and average 
factor quantity ratios for the Continental  and Anglo-Saxon  countries. 
The averages are constructed with  1980 relative GDPs,  using purchas- 
ing power parity exchange  rates, and each ratio is normalized to equal 
1.0  in  each  country  in  1970.  This  figure  makes  two  points.  In the 
Continental countries,  the period up to the early  1980s was character- 
ized  both by a decrease  in the profit rate relative to the wage  rate (in 
efficiency  units) and by a decrease in labor (in efficiency  units) relative 
to capital.  Since that time,  however,  the profit rate has improved rela- 
tive  to the wage,  while  the ratio of  labor to capital  has continued  to 
decrease,  albeit more slowly.  This is what lies  behind the increase  in 
the capital share. By contrast,  in the Anglo-Saxon  countries,  the evo- 
lutions  of  the factor price and factor quantity ratios show  little  or no 
trend, and the movements  appear to reflect business  cycle  fluctuations 
rather than medium-run evolutions. 
Next,  I take a more formal econometric  approach, although still  in 
the spirit of data description.  Let pratioi,  ln(wi,/i-,)  be the log of the 
factor price ratio and qratioi,  ln(fii,/ki,)  be the log of the factor quantity 
ratio, where i is the country and t is time. One can then run the following 
panel regression: 
(2)  pratioi, =  y(qratioi,) +  xi  +  x,  +  Ei,, 
where xi and x, are coefficients  on country and time dummies,  respec- 
tively. 
The results for both Continental and Anglo-Saxon  countries are re- 
ported in table  1 and figure 3. Table  1 gives  the estimated coefficient  y 
and the significance  level associated with the test that all the coefficients 
on the time dummies  are equal to zero.  Figure 3 plots the time series 
of estimated coefficients  on the time dummies  (normalized  so that the 
value in  1970 is equal to zero),  along  with two-standard-error bands. 98  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
Figure  2. Factor  Price and Factor Quantity  Ratios across Three Decades, 
Continental  and Anglo-Saxon  Countriesa 
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Source:  Author's  calculations  (see figure 1). 
a. The ratio  of profit  to wage corresponds  to 7t/lv  (the profit  rate divided by the wage per efficiency unit). The ratio of labor  to 
capital refers  to il/k (labor in efficiency units divided by the capital stock). Cross-country  averages  weight countries  in proportion 
to 1980 GDP, measured  at purchasing  power parity  exchange rates.  For the Continental  countries,  the sample period is 1970-93; 
for the Anglo-Saxon countries, 1967-95. Olivier J. Blanchard  99 
Table 1. Regressing  Factor  Prices on Factor  Quantities, 1961-95a 
Coefficient on  p value for 
Panel  logfactor  quantity ratio  time dummiesb 
Continental countries:  0.96  0.00 
(0.08) 
Anglo-Saxon  countriesd  1.12  0.03 
(0.07) 
Source: Author's regressions based on data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's data 
diskette OECD Buisiniess  Sector Data Base,  1997/1. 
a. The dependent variable is the log factor price ratio (log of the ratio of the profit rate to the wage rate in efficiency units 
for a given country and year). Independent  variables include the log factor quantity ratio (log of the ratio of labor in efficiency 
units to the capital stock), country dummies, and annual time dummies. Samples are unbalanced  panels. For some countries, 
observations begin as late as 1972; for Germany, the final observation is  1990. Newey-West corrected standard  errors are 
shown in parentheses. 
b. Probability of obtaining these data given that time fixed effects are actually zero for all years. 
c. Continental countries comprise Australia, Austria, Belgium,  Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Nether- 
lands, Spain. and Sweden. 
d. Anglo-Saxon countries comprise Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Together,  table  1 and figure 3 confirm the visual impressions  given  by 
figure 2.  For both groups of  countries,  the estimated  coefficient  y  is 
close  to  one  (and by  implication,  so  is  its  inverse,  the  elasticity  of 
substitution  in the CES case),  implying  little  scope  for movements  in 
the  share in the  absence  of  shifts  in the relation.  The time  series  of 
estimated time dummies for the Continental countries shows a decrease 
in the late  1970s and then a steady increase since  the early  1980s: the 
ratio of the profit rate to the wage rate is indeed higher than would be 
predicted  by  the evolution  in the ratio of  labor to  capital.  The  time 
dummies for Anglo-Saxon  countries show no trend. 
These  conclusions  appear robust to a number of variations.  For ex- 
ample, allowing  the parameter y to vary across countries yields a range 
for the coefficient  y; between  2. 10 (for Italy) and 0.29  (for the Neth- 
erlands), but does not substantially affect the shape of the series of time 
dummies.  Running  the regression  in reverse-that  is,  regressing  the 
ratio of  factor quantities  on the ratio of  factor prices-yields  an esti- 
mated elasticity  of  substitution  of 0.75  (and thus an implied  value  of 
1.33 for y),  but does not affect the shape of the series of time dummies 
substantially (up to a sign change).  And dropping one country at a time 
does not much change the estimated parameter; that is,  no single coun- 
try appears to be responsible  for the results. 
There are various reasons to expect  the estimated parameter y to be 
biased  toward  one.  Business  cycle  fluctuations  are associated  with 100  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
Figure  3.  Time  Variation  in Factor  Price Ratios, Controlling  for Factor Quantity 
Ratios, Continental  and Anglo-Saxon  Countries,  1963-96a 
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Source:  Author's  regressions  based on data used in figure 1. 
a. Figure plots, for each panel of countries,  the time dummy  coefficients from a regression  of the log ratio  of profit  to wage on 
the log ratio of labor to capital, country dummies, and time dummies. Regression corresponds  to equation 2 in the text and is 
described in table 1, note a. For the Continental  countries, the sample period ends in 1995; for the Anglo-Saxon countries, in 
1996. Dashed lines are two-standard-error  bands. Olivier  J. Blanchard  101 
largely spurious fluctuations in measured total factor productivity,  and 
thus  spurious  fluctuations  in  both  wages  and labor,  when  these  are 
measured  in  efficiency  units.  In  a boom,  measured  productivity  in- 
creases,  decreasing the wage in efficiency  units and increasing labor in 
efficiency  units; these  similar proportional increases  on both sides  of 
equation 2 are likely  to bias the estimated parameter towards one.  As a 
rough solution to this problem, I have estimated equation 2 using values 
of  qratioi,  lagged  m,.  .  .  m +9  times  as  instruments,  for  m  =  3,  4,  5. 
The instrumental variable results are largely similar to the ordinary least 
squares results: y is equal to  1.03  for m  =  3,  to  1.12  for m  =  4,  and 
to  1.26  form  =  5." 
I see four ways of interpreting these results and the apparent shift in 
the relation between factor prices and factor quantities in the Continen- 
tal countries: 
MISSPECIFIED  DYNAMICS.  The  first interpretation is  that while  there 
has been a stable relation between factor prices and factor quantities,  it 
is not the static relation estimated in equation 2,  but rather, a dynamic 
relation in which  firms respond to changes  in factor prices only  over 
time.  Factor proportions are largely embodied in existing  capital: tech- 
nology is putty clay.  In other words, the relation in equation 2 is misspe- 
cified, and the apparent  shifts are artifacts of this misspecification. 
The specific  argument is the following:  Firms have taken a long time 
to respond to the adverse labor supply shifts of the 1970s by shifting to 
technologies  that use relatively  less  labor and relatively  more capital, 
to decrease their ratio of labor to capital.  As they have done so,  profit 
rates have steadily recovered.  Thus the continuing decrease in the ratio 
of labor to capital in the face of an improving ratio of profits to wages 
that is  seen  in Continental  countries  is  simply  the result of  this  long 
drawn out dynamic adjustment. 
SHIFTS  IN  THE  DISTRIBUTION  OF  RENTS.  If one  assumes  instead  that 
the shifts shown  in figure 3 are genuine,  logic  dictates that they come 
from one  of  two  sources:  shifts  in the distribution  of  rents or biased 
technological  change.  I start with the former. 
One can think of shifts in the distribution of rents between  workers 
11.  Another source of bias is measurement error in capital, which affects capital and 
the profit rate-computed  as profit divided  by capital-in  opposite  directions.  To  the 
extent that this measurement error is highly serially correlated (as is likely),  the problem 
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and firms generically  as changes  in the relation between  the marginal 
product  of  labor  and  the  wage.  It  is  convenient  here  to  define  the 
"markup"  as the ratio of the marginal product to the real wage,  and to 
think in terms of changes in this markup. 12 Now suppose that at a given 
factor quantity ratio,  and thus a given  marginal product of  labor,  the 
real wage  decreases-or  equivalently,  the markup increases.  Clearly 
this  will  lead  to  an increase  in the factor price ratio (the wage  goes 
down,  the  profit rate goes  up).  Thus  an increase  in the  markup can 
account for the shifts in figure 3.  But from where has such an increase 
in the  markup come?  Again  as a matter of  logic,  it may have  come 
either from changes in price-setting in the goods market or from changes 
in wage-setting  in the labor market. 
Consider the goods  market first. If firms take the wage as given,  the 
markup as I have  defined  it coincides  with the markup of  price over 
marginal  cost. '3  Thus  the  shifts  in  figure  3  could  be  interpreted as 
showing  that firms have steadily increased their markups in goods mar- 
kets  since  the  early  1980s.  I  find this  explanation  implausible.  The 
period since  the early  1980s has been characterized by increased,  not 
decreased,  competition-especially  so in continental Europe, with the 
reduction of  barriers to trade within the European Union.  Phelps  has 
argued that high real interest rates since the early 1980s have led firms 
to care less about their customer base, and thus to go for higher markups 
and higher profit margins in the short run. 14 But it is difficult to believe 
that this effect,  to the extent that it has been present, could have offset 
the effects  of  steadily  stronger competition  in goods  markets over the 
past fifteen years. 
It seems  more plausible  that if there has indeed been an increase in 
the markup, it has come from the labor market. Which model of wage 
determination best describes the labor market is still very much an open 
question.  But in a number of plausible descriptions of wage-setting,  the 
12.  When there are costs  of adjusting labor or factor proportions,  as in the previous 
interpretation,  this ratio has to be redefined to include  marginal costs  of  adjustment in 
addition to the wage.  The specifics  are better left to the formal model below. 
13.  Some  simple  algebra may help here.  Let pL  be the ratio of price (P) to marginal 
cost  (MC): P  =  pLMC.  If firms take the wage  as given,  marginal cost  is given  by the 
wage  divided  by  the  marginal product of  labor (MP): MC  =  WIMP. Putting the two 
relations  together  gives  P  =  pLWIMP;  or,  defining  the real wage  as  w  =  WIP, p.  = 
MPIw,  which  is my definition of the markup. 
14.  Phelps  (1994). Olivier  J. Blanchard  103 
wage  need not be equal to the marginal product of labor.  '5  In models 
of  "efficient  bargaining,"  for example,  the marginal product of labor 
is set equal to the reservation wage.  The wage itself is then set between 
the average  and the marginal products of  labor,  with the weights  de- 
pending on the relative  bargaining powers  of  the union and the firm. 
Under that interpretation,  the  increased  markup reflects  the fact  that 
unions  have  become  less  powerful  in the Continental  countries,  and 
that the wage has come closer to the marginal product of labor. To the 
extent that unions were already weaker in the Anglo-Saxon  countries, 
this may explain  the difference  in the evolution  of  the two groups of 
countries. 
Another  interpretation is  based  on  a decline  in labor hoarding,  or 
featherbedding practices, in the Continental countries. This story would 
go as follows:  In the early  1980s Continental firms were characterized 
by chronic excess  employment;  equivalently,  workers were employed 
to the point where the product of the last worker was below  his or her 
wage. 16 As unions have become weaker, firms have been able to reduce 
this excess  employment,  thus increasing the marginal product relative 
to the wage.  The markup has risen from a value below one (a marginal 
product lower than the wage)  to a value closer to one. 
TECHNOLOGICAL  BIAS.  Alternatively,  shifts  in the relation  between 
factor  prices  and  factor  quantities  may  reflect  biased  technological 
change;  or  perhaps  more  accurately,  biased  technological  adoption, 
given that technological  knowledge  is probably largely common among 
OECD  countries.  If,  since  the  early  1980s,  Continental  firms have 
consistently  introduced technologies  that use less  labor and more cap- 
ital,  the  same  ratio of  labor to  capital  would  correspond  to  a lower 
marginal product of labor, and thus a lower wage,  and, in turn, a higher 
factor price ratio. 
The question then becomes why the Anglo-Saxon  and the Continental 
countries might have adopted different technologies  over time.  A ten- 
tative answer relies  on induced bias in technological  adoption,  paral- 
leling  the  argument developed  in  the  misspecification  interpretation 
above.  In the same way as labor supply shifts led firms, over time,  to 
move to technologies  using less labor and more capital, they may have 
15.  Dickens  (1995)  provides  a nice review. 
16.  For a discussion  of  why  bargaining  may produce featherbedding,  see  Johnson 
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led firms to develop  or adopt new technologies  that were biased against 
labor.  Indeed,  the distinction  between  movements  along  an isoquant 
(choices  among  existing  technologies)  and shifts  in the isoquant (de- 
velopment and adoption of new technologies)  is probably much sharper 
in economists'  models  than in reality. 
TRADE  AND  COMPOSITION  EFFECTS.  A fourth interpretation dismisses 
the shifts  in the relation between  factor prices and factor quantities as 
reflecting  composition  effects.  A  particularly strong statement  along 
these lines  is the factor price equalization  theorem.  Simply put, to the 
extent that trade leads to factor price equalization,  one should not expect 
any relation  between  the ratio of  aggregate  factor quantities  and the 
ratio of factor prices in a country. Thus what I have called shifts in that 
relation  may  merely  capture the effects  of  the  world  factor quantity 
ratio on domestic  factor price ratios-although  the difference  between 
factor price evolutions  in the Continental and in the Anglo-Saxon  coun- 
tries would appear to be prima facie evidence  against the hypothesis  of 
factor price equalization. 
One way to explore the relative importance of composition  effects  is 
to look at more disaggregated evidence  within each country. Under the 
factor price equalization theorem, the relation between factor prices and 
factor quantities should hold for each firm but disappear at the aggregate 
level,  because  of  the  composition  effects  induced  by  trade.  I  have 
started looking  at sectoral evidence  in France, at roughly the two-digit 
(by Standard Industrial Classification)  level of disaggregation,  and find 
that the increase in the share holds in nearly all tradable sectors.  Unless 
composition  effects  are only at work at a lower level of disaggregation, 
this suggests  that the factor price equalization  theorem is not the main 
source of the evolutions  described above. 
Shifts, Capital Shares, and Unemployment 
The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  build  a simple  model  that both 
formalizes  the  arguments  presented  above  and prepares the  way  for 
a quantitative  interpretation  of  medium-run  evolutions  in  the  next 
section.  17 
17.  Caballero  and Hammour (1998)  build a richer model,  with explicit  putty clay Olivier J. Blanchard  105 
The Model 
The  basic  structure of  the  model  is  a  set  of  demand  and  supply 
equations  for labor and for capital.  The two demand relations are de- 
rived from costs  of changing  capital and costs  of changing  factor pro- 
portions.  Capital accumulation depends on current and expected  future 
marginal profits; adjustment in factor proportions,  on the relation be- 
tween current and expected  marginal revenue products and wages.  On 
the  supply  side,  the  wage  is  an increasing  function  of  employment, 
while the interest rate is assumed independent of capital accumulation. 
The specific  assumptions  are as follows. 
The  economy  is  composed  of  monopolistically  competitive  firms. 
The reason  for introducing  monopolistic  competition  is to be able to 
trace the effects  of markup changes,  taking these as a stand-in for shifts 
in the distribution of rents in the economy. 
Each firm uses one unit of capital,  which it combines  with variable 
amounts of labor to produce output. The production function of a firm 
is given  by"8 
(3)  y  = f(n,  1). 
The capital stock is thus equal to the number of firms in the economy, 
and changes  in the capital stock correspond to the entry and exit deci- 
sions of firms. A continuing firm makes only one decision  at any point 
in time: how much labor to employ.  Note that n is both employment  in 
a given firm and the ratio of labor to capital for the economy  as a whole. 
This separation between capital accumulation decisions  and factor pro- 
portion  decisions  is  inessential;  but keeping  these  decisions  sharply 
distinct is helpful  for the discussion  of adjustment of capital and labor 
below. 
As  noted,  each  firm is  monopolistically  competitive  in the  goods 
market. The demand for its good  is given,  in inverse form, by 
technology  and  explicit  bargaining  in  the  labor  market.  This  allows  them  to  relate 
macroeconomic  outcomes  to  institutional  changes  in the  structure of  bargaining,  un- 
employment  benefit  rules,  and so  on.  In this  paper,  I take a number of  shortcuts that 
keep the model simpler but, admittedly,  poorer. 
18.  Harrod-neutral technological  progress  can be  introduced  straightforwardly; all 
that is needed is to measure labor and wages in efficiency  units. For notational simplicity, 
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ly\ 
P=  0y  ?  y  K  1, 
where p is the price charged by the firm relative to the price level,  y is 
average  output,  and y  is  the  inverse  of  the  elasticity  of  demand.  It 
follows  from this  constant  elasticity  specification  that the markup of 
price  over  marginal  cost  charged  by  a  firm  will  be  equal  to  pL 
1/(1  -  y). 
Each firm faces  costs of adjusting its ratio of labor to capital; equiv- 
alently,  its  employment  level.  Rather than explicitly  allowing  for  a 
putty clay  structure of technology,  I assume that each firm faces  costs 
of  adjusting factor proportions.  Specifically,  I assume the cost  of  ad- 
justinig n to be given  by (c/2)(dn/dt)2,  where c is a parameter. 
Each firm faces  a constant probability of death 8, a real interest rate 
r, and a real wage (in terms of the price level)  w. Under these assump- 
tions,  at  any  point  in  time,  the  firm chooses  employment  so  as  to 
maximize  its value,  given  (for time 0) by 
v  e  (  )  LT-(2)  (d)2 dt, 
where 
7rT  p  y-  w n. 
The  first order conditions  and the  symmetry  condition  that all  firms 
must charge the same price,  so that p  =  1, are then given  by 
dn  I 
dt  c 
dq  =  (r  +  8)q  -T,,  dt 
=  (ii)  f,(n,  1)  -w. 
Firms adjust the ratio of  labor to capital in response  to the present 
value of  marginal profit, denoted by q.  Marginal profit is equal to the 
marginal revenue product of labor (which is itself equal to the marginal 
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the long  run, the marginal product of  labor must be equal to the real 
wage times the miarkup  (equivalently,  the marginal revenue product of 
labor must be equal to the real wage).  Denoting  steady-state values by 
a star, 
(4)  f,,(n*,  1)  =  L we. 
Note that from the point of view  of determining employment,  a higher 
markup acts like  a tax on the marginal product of  labor (this is a tax 
collected  by  the  firm,  however,  so  that its  effect  on  profit is  quite 
different).  A higher markup induces  firms to choose  a lower  level  of 
employment,  and thus leads to a lower ratio of labor to capital. 
As mentioned,  the evolution  of the stock of capital comes  from the 
entry and exit  of  firms.  To  capture the slow  adjustment of  capital,  I 
assume  costs  of  adjustment for capital: the relative  price of  capital is 
an increasing  function  of  the net rate of  entry (equivalently,  the  net 
change in the capital stock).  Specifically, 
dK 
(5)  Pk  1  +  hd 
where  h  is  a parameter and K denotes  the  capital  stock.  Free  entry 
implies  that the following  condition  must hold: 
V  Pk, 
where v is the value  of  the firm, defined above.  If firms could  freely 
choose  their initial factor proportions,  the model would yield  a distri- 
bution of factor proportions across firms, with the proportion depending 
on time of entry. To avoid such heterogeneity,  I assume that new firms 
enter with the same ratio of labor to capital as existing firms. This keeps 
the model tractable; but it also eliminates  the entry and exit of firms as 
a candidate  channel  for change  in aggregate  factor proportions  over 
time.  19 
The value  of  a new  firm must be equal to the price of the machine 
needed to produce its goods.  From the definition of v above,  v is char- 
acterized by 
19.  One of  the contributions  of  Caballero  and Hammour's  (1998)  model  is that it 
keeps  track of  the  distribution  of  firms  and  its  implications,  for  example,  for  wage 
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dv  =  (r  +  8)v  -  [  -  (c)  ()2] 
Entry takes place  (equivalently,  the capital stock increases)  when the 
value of  an existing  firm is greater than one.  In steady state,  dvldt  = 
dnldt  =  dK/dt  =  0,  so that the previous equations imply that 
(6)  w  =  * (r  +  8)  =  (r  +  8). 
Profit per unit of capital is equal to the user cost. 
This  ends  the description  of  the dynamic  demands  for capital  and 
labor. The aggregate demand for labor is given  by N  =  nK, the ratio 
of labor to capital in each firm times the number of firms. 
I specify  the supply of factors as follows.  I assume the real wage to 
be a constant elasticity  function of the ratio of employment to the labor 
force,  NIN, 
(7)  w =0 (0  ) 
where ,B  is the elasticity  of the wage with respect to employment  and 0 
is a multiplicative  constant.  And I assume r to be exogenous.  This is a 
strong assumption.  In combination  with equation 6,  it implies  that the 
long-run supply curve of capital is infinitely elastic  and the profit rate 
always  returns to the same value: r  +  6. 
Functional  Forms and Parameters 
I choose  functional  forms and parameters as follows.  The unit time 
period is one year. The production function is CES,  of the form 
_  _  cr 
(8)  y  =  A (1  -  a)n  +  a  J_- 
(Capital is implicitly  present in the production function,  but since each 
firm uses one unit of capital,  it is equal to one.) 
The coefficient  multiplying  capital (a) is 0.3  and the multiplicative 
constant (A) is 0.5.  In the long run, the response of the capital share to 
an increase  in wages  depends on the elasticity  a.  The evidence  below 
points to a value for a-  close to 1.0. Therefore I use 1.0 as the benchmark 
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crease in the capital share, I also examine  the case where a  is equal to 
2.0. 
The probability of death for firms (8)-equivalently,  the depreciation 
rate-is  equal to 0.1  and the real interest rate (r) is equal to 0.05.  The 
initial value of y is 0, corresponding to the case of perfect competition; 
this implies  a value for the markup ([t)  of  1.0. 
The value for c is equal to 4.0.  In a world in which production was 
strictly  putty  clay,  only  the  newly  installed  capital  stock-roughly 
10 percent of the total each year-would  embody the new desired factor 
proportions.  This would  imply a mean lag of adjustment of 4.5  years. 
In the present case,  my chosen  value of c implies  that firms each year 
close  roughly  17 percent of the gap between  desired and actual factor 
proportions. This,  in turn, implies  a mean lag of 4.8  years. 
The value for h is equal to 10.0.  This implies an elasticity  of invest- 
ment with respect to the relative price of capital (pk)  of  1.0.  Empirical 
evidence  on the relation of investment  to Tobin's  q yields  lower elas- 
ticities,  and thus higher implied  values  for h.  But as discussed  in that 
literature,  these  estimates  of  h  are likely  to  be  biased  upward.  The 
instrumental variable approach used by Jason Cummins, Kevin Hassett, 
and Glenn Hubbard yields  an elasticity  of about 0.7.20 
I normalize  the labor force  to be equal to  1.0.  I choose  0 equal to 
0.35,  which implies  zero unemployment in the initial steady state. The 
elasticity of the wage with respect to employment  ,B  is equal to 1.0.  For 
an average  unemployment  rate of  10 percent,  this corresponds  to an 
elasticity  of  roughly  0. 1,  which  is  close  to  the  estimates  of  David 
Blanchflower and Andrew Oswald for a number of countries.  My work 
with Lawrence Katz suggests  that the elasticity  is,  in fact,  lower in the 
short run and higher in the long run; I ignore those dynamics here.22 
These  parameters and their implications  for steady-state  values  of 
output and other variables are presented in table 2. 
Shifts in Labor Supply, Changes  in the Distribution  of Rents, and 
Technological  Bias 
With the discussion  of the previous  section  in mind,  I consider  the 
effects  of three different types of shift. 
20.  Cummins,  Hassett,  and Hubbard (1994). 
21.  Blanchflower  and Oswald  (1994). 
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Table 2.  Parameters  and Steady-State  Values 
Parameters 
(r Elasticity of substitution  1.0 or 2.0 
a Coefficient on capital in production function  0.3 
A Multiplicative constant in production function  0.5 
8 Depreciation rate  0.1 
pL  Gross markup  1.0 
r Interest rate  0.05 
c Cost of adjusting ratio of labor to capital  4.0 
h Cost of adjusting capital stock  10.0 
c  Elasticity of wage with respect to unemployment  1.0 
0 Wage at zero unemployment  0.35 
Steady-state values 
Output  0.50 
Employment  1.00 
Capital  1.00 
Wage rate  0.35 
Profit rate  0.15 
Capital share  0.30 
Unemployment  0.00 
ADVERSE  SHIFTS  IN  LABOR  SUPPLY.  Figure 4 shows  the effects  of  an 
unexpected,  permanent,  adverse  shift  in  labor  supply:  a  10 percent 
increase  in  0  in  equation  7.  Put less  formally,  the  figure  shows  the 
effects  of an adverse wage push. Throughout, the model is solved under 
the assumption of rational expectations.  Figure 4 plots the evolution  of 
the profit rate,  the wage  rate,  the ratio of  the profit rate to the wage 
rate, the ratio of labor to capital,  the capital share, and the unemploy- 
ment rate, for two values  of cT: 1.0 and 2.0. 
At the initial ratio of labor to capital,  the increase in wages  leads to 
a corresponding decrease in the profit rate, as well  as a decrease in the 
capital  share.  This  triggers two  dynamic  responses.  First,  firms shift 
away from labor over time,  leading to a decrease  in the ratio of labor 
to capital.  This,  in turn, leads  to a partial recovery  of  the profit rate 
and, if the elasticity  of substitution is greater than one,  to a more than 
full recovery of the capital share. Second,  lower profit leads, over time, 
to a net exit of firms and a decrease  in the capital stock. 
Both lower capital and a lower ratio of labor to capital lead to lower 
employment,  higher unemployment,  and a decrease  in the wage.  The 
effect  of  the  initial  wage  push on the  wage  is  steadily  offset  by  the 
effect  of  higher unemployment.  In the long  run, the profit rate must Olivier  J. Blanchard  111 
Figure  4. Dynamic  Effects of an Adverse Labor Supply Shifta 
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Source:  Author's  calculations,  as described  in text. 
a. Graphs  show simulated  dynamic effects of a 10 percent increase in the parameter  0; the increase occurs in quarter  5. Solid 
line results when elasticity of substitution  is set to one; dashed line, when elasticity is set to two. All other parameters  take the 
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return to its initial  value.  This implies  that the wage  must also return 
to its initial value.  Given the unit elasticity  of the wage with respect to 
employment,  both employment and capital decrease by 10 percent. The 
capital  share returns to  its  initial  value,  and the unemployment  rate 
increases  to  10 percent. 
In summary,  adverse  labor supply  shifts  can generate  both an in- 
crease  in unemployment  over  time  and the kind of  movement  in the 
capital  share  that has  been  observed  in  the  Continental  countries- 
namely,  an initial  decrease  followed,  in the medium run, by a more 
than full recovery.  But to the extent that unemployment  puts pressure 
on the wage  to return to its initial  value,  the medium-run increase  in 
the capital share is quite small.  In the simulation corresponding to a  = 
2.0,  the capital share never rises much above its initial level. 
INCREASE  IN  THE  MARKUP.  Figure 5  shows  the effects  of  an unex- 
pected,  permanent,  increase  in the markup: a  10 percentage point in- 
crease in w.23 Recall  that the markup acts like a tax on labor. Thus in 
response to an increase in the markup, firms decrease employment over 
time.  This  leads  to an increase  in unemployment,  and higher unem- 
ployment,  in turn, leads to a decrease  in the wage.  As a result of both 
of  these  effects,  the capital share increases.  Thus in the medium run, 
the markup shift  leads  to both an increase  in the capital share and an 
increase  in unemployment. 
The decrease  in the wage,  in turn, leads to an increase in the profit 
rate. Thus a second  mechanism  comes  into play: the entry of firms in 
response  to the higher profit rate. Unemployment,  after its initial  in- 
crease,  starts to  fall;  the  rise  in the  number of  firms dominates  the 
decrease  in the ratio of labor to capital in each individual firm. 
In the long run, the implication of free entry and a given interest rate 
is that the profit rate must return to its original  value.  Thus to a first 
approximation,  the wage  also  must return to its initial value,  as must 
unemployment;  the effect  on employment  of a lower ratio of labor to 
capital in each firm is offset by a larger number of firms, a larger capital 
stock.24 The  capital  share,  however,  remains permanently higher,  as 
the ratio of labor to capital is lower at any given  wage rate. 
23.  Rotemberg  and Woodford  (1991, 1998) draw  attention  to the role that changes 
in markups  play in business cycle fluctuations.  This paper  draws  attention  also to their 
potential  medium-run  implications. 
24.  "To a first  approximation"  means  that  the result  holds for small changes in the Olivier  J. Blanchard  113 
Figure  5. Dynamic  Effects of an Increase  in the Markupa 
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While the markup in the model comes  from monopoly  power in the 
goods  market, any change  in the distribution of rents that leads to an 
increase  in  iL will  have similar effects.  Consider,  for example,  an in- 
crease  in  V.  coming  from a decrease  in featherbedding  practices.  The 
dynamics  will  be  identical  to  those  shown  in  figure  5.25  At  a given 
wage,  firms want to reduce employment,  and they do so over time. This 
leads to an increase in unemployment,  but also a higher profit rate and 
a higher capital share.  Over time,  the increase  in the profit rate leads 
to  entry of  firms and capital  accumulation,  and consequently  unem- 
ployment  decreases  until it has returned roughly to its initial level.  By 
this time,  the profit rate has returned to its normal level,  but the capital 
share remains high. 
In summary,  in the short and medium runs increases  in the markup 
lead  to  an  increase  in  unemployment  and an increase  in the  capital 
share. Unemployment  does eventually  return to its initial value but, as 
the simulation shows,  this takes a very long time. Thus upward markup 
shifts-or,  more generally,  shifts in the distribution of rents from work- 
ers to  firms-appear  potentially  able to explain  the evolutions  in the 
Continental countries since  the early  1980s. 
BIASED  TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE.  I formalize  the  effects  of  biased 
technological  change  as an increase in the coefficient  on capital (a) in 
the production function given by equation 8. In the Cobb-Douglas  case, 
this takes the simple form of an increase in the exponent for capital and 
a corresponding  decrease in the exponent for labor. This formalization 
captures  the  idea  that new  technologies  save  on  labor,  and has  the 
advantage that the bias is well defined even in the Cobb-Douglas  case.26 
Figure 6 shows  the effects  of  a 10 percentage point increase in the 
markup,  starting  from  an initial  value of 1.0 (that  is, there  are  no distortions  at the start). 
For larger  changes, or if one starts  from a value of ,u greater  than one, the wage rate 
ends up a bit lower and the unemployment  rate  a bit higher. 
25.  The welfare implications  will be different,  however. An increase  in the markup 
coming from increased  monopoly  power  (that  is, an increase  in ,u  above one) represents 
an increase in distortions.  The elimination  of featherbedding  (that is, an increase  in p. 
toward  one from a lower value) represents  a decrease  in distortions. 
26.  A while back, Houthakker  (1956) showed how one could think of the Cobb- 
Douglas production  function  as the result  of aggregation  of Leontief  functions,  with the 
coefficients  of the underlying  functions  jointly Pareto-distributed.  The same  justification 
applies in the present  context. Firms introduce  new technologies  that increase  the pro- 
portion  of relatively  capital-intensive  methods  of production,  and thus the value of the 
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Figure 6. Dynamic  Effects of Biased Technological  Changea 
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Source:  Author's  calculations,  as described  in text. 
a. Graphs  show simulated  dynamic effects of an increase in the coefficient on capital in the production  function:  a is increased 
from 0.3 to 0.4 in quarter  5. Solid line results when elasticity of substitution  is set to one; dashed line, when elasticity is set to 
two. All other  parameters  take the values given in table 2. 116  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
coefficient  a,  from 0.3  to 0.4.27  It is striking how much figure 6 looks 
like  figure 5-the  effects  of technological  bias are nearly identical  to 
those of an increase in the markup. At the initial ratio of labor to capital, 
the change leads to an increase in the profit rate and an adverse shift in 
labor demand. This,  in turn, triggers the same dynamics as an increase 
in the  markup, resulting  in increases  in both unemployment  and the 
capital share. 
Thus this last simulation offers two lessons.  First, technological  bias 
provides  another potential explanation  for the evolutions  in the Conti- 
nental countries since the early  1980s.  And second,  it may be difficult 
to  distinguish  these  effects  from  those  of  markup shifts,  unless  one 
looks  directly at the production function,  which is affected  by techno- 
logical  bias but not by changes  in the distribution of rents. 
Looking at Evolutions in Specific Countries 
The  next  step  is  to  see  whether  and how  the  model  can  explain 
observed  evolutions  in specific  countries.  It would  be overambitious 
and space-consuming  to analyze each country individually in this paper. 
Therefore I present the results for one country-France-and  then sum- 
marize the results for the others. 
Constructing  the Shifts 
I first construct empirical series for labor supply shifts, labor demand 
shifts,  and shifts in user cost (which are present in the sample, although 
I have not focused  on them so far) with which to simulate the model. 
SHIFTS  IN  LABOR  SUPPLY.  I start  from  equation  7.  Allowing  for 
Harrod-neutral technological  progress,  taking logarithms,  and approx- 
imating the difference  between the log of the labor force and the log of 
actual  employment  by  minus  the  unemployment  rate,  that equation 
becomes 
27.  In changing relative marginal  products, one must be careful not to introduce 
productivity-level  effects. In general, if the ratio of labor  to capital is different from 
1  .0, the change in coefficients  will change  productivity,  unless offset by a change  in the 
multiplicative  constant. This issue does not arise here, as in the initial steady state the 
ratio  of labor  to capital is equal to 1.0. Olivier J. Blanchard  117 
(9)  ln w  = ln  0  -  u, 
where u is the unemployment rate and w-  is, again, the wage in efficiency 
units.  I first construct  the  series  for the wage  in efficiency  units.28 I 
then construct the series for (log)  labor supply shifts as ln 0 -lnii  + 
3u. Finally,  I normalize this series to equal zero in 1970. 
By  constructing  labor supply  shifts  in this  way,  I do  not mean to 
imply that the "true"  labor supply relation has the form of equation 9. 
As mentioned  above,  the true labor supply or wage relation has richer 
dynamics-from  overlapping wage-setting  to hysteresis-and  includes 
many other variables.  Thus the labor supply shifts that I construct are 
combinations  of  these  dynamic  effects  and movements  in these  other 
variables. The best way to think about equation 9 and these labor supply 
shifts  is  as  giving  the distance  of  the  wage  from  that which,  in  the 
absence  of other shifts,  would allow  the economy  to return to its  1970 
unemployment  rate. 
Figure 7 shows  labor supply  shifts  in France for three values  of  3: 
1.0  (the value  that I use  above  and again  in the simulations  below), 
0.5,  and 1.5.  All three series show a large increase in the early  1970s, 
with the wage  increasing  much faster than measured total factor pro- 
ductivity; a peak at around 15 percent (for the intermediate case) in the 
early  1980s;  and a  subsequent  decline.  In  1996,  the  value  of  labor 
supply shifts stands between  1 and 10 percent, depending on the value 
of P. Put another way, French wages in efficiency  units are lower today 
than they were in  1970; but they would be too high if unemployment 
decreased,  subjecting them to upward pressure. How high is "too high" 
depends on the assumed value of ,3, the effect  of unemployment on the 
wage. 
Relating these labor supply shifts to specific changes in the economic 
environment  and  in  labor  market institutions  must  wait  for  another 
paper. But based on the large amount of research on European unem- 
ployment,  I do not think that there is any great mystery about what lies 
28.  Robert  Hall has shown that  if the markup  is different  from  one, the computation 
of total factor  productivity  growth  must  be modified  to take account  of the effect of the 
markup  on the shares; see,  for example, Hall (1990). The results reported  here are 
derived  under  the assumption  that  the average  markup  during  the period  is equal  to 1.0. 
I have carried  out the same exercise under  the assumption  that the average  markup  is 
equal  to 1  .2, with very similar  results. 00 
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behind  them.29 The  slowdown  in productivity  growth  starting in the 
mid-1970s  and the increase  in oil  prices  were not instantaneously  re- 
flected  in lower- real wage  growth,  as a result of  which  the wage  in- 
creased  relative  to  total  factor productivity  during the  1970s.  In re- 
sponse to higher unemployment,  labor market institutions were changed 
so  as to protect employed  workers against the risk of  unemployment 
and improve  the welfare  of  the unemployed.  Those  changes  lessened 
the effect  of unemployment  on wages.  Since  then,  oil prices have re- 
turned to their 1970s levels  and workers have presumably adjusted their 
expectations  to the lower rate of productivity growth. And indeed,  this 
is reflected in the decline  in labor supply shifts since  the early  1980s. 
As to why the shifts have not been fully undone, hysteresis  is probably 
relevant.  Labor market institutions  are not the same as those in  1970. 
In France the treatment of unemployment,  for example,  is now consid- 
erably more generous. Also,  long-term unemployment has marginalized 
many workers,  reducing  the weight  of  the  long-term  unemployed  in 
wage determination. 
SHIFTS IN LABOR DEMAND.  I take labor demand shifts to be shifts  in 
the markup. As  I make clear below,  if one  were to interpret these  as 
the result of technological  bias the constructed series would be identi- 
cal,  and the  simulation  results  would  be  largely  similar  (as  shown 
above). 
I define the markup above as the ratio of the marginal product to the 
wage,  ignoring  the  costs  of  adjusting  the  ratio  of  labor  to  capital. 
Assuming  that the production function is CES with elasticity  of substi- 
tution cr, this relation takes the form 
(10)  In  wi +  In  F  =  constant  +  ln(1 -  a)  -  (  )ln(n). 
The  right-hand  side  gives  the  logarithm  of  the  marginal  product of 
labor. The left-hand side gives  the logarithm of the real wage times the 
markup. Given a value for cr, and under the maintained assumption that 
the parameter a is constant, one can construct a series for the log markup 
(up to a constant term) using equation  10.30 
29.  See, for example, Nickell (1997) for a recent  assessment. 
30.  Under  the additional  assumption  u =  1.0, the change  in the log markup  is equal 
to minus  the change in the log of the share  of labor-a  convenient  fact for back-of-the- 120  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
This  equation  is only  correct,  however,  in the absence  of  costs  of 
adjusting  factor  proportions.  If  it  is  costly  for  firms to  adjust those 
proportions,  an increase in the wage will be associated  with little con- 
temporaneous change in nlk, and thus little change in fily. This, in turn, 
will  lead to a decrease  in the measured markup. I show below  (in the 
upper panel of figure 8, with the series corresponding to A =  0.0)  that 
this is indeed  what happens in the case of France: absent a correction 
for costs  of adjustment, markup shifts turn out to be highly  negatively 
correlated with the labor supply shifts constructed above. 
To take account of the dependence  of factor proportions on the his- 
tory of wages as well as on the current wage,  I replace the current wage 
(w)  by a weighted  average of current and lagged wages  (17pa).  This is a 
simpler but rougher approach than trying to account for both past and 
expected  future values  of  the  wage,  as  implied  by the  model  of  the 
previous  section.3'  Specifically,  I construct  the log  markup (up to  a 
constant)  as 
where 
ln  0i,  =  A ln  +  (1  -  X) ln i, 
and A is a parameter reflecting  the speed of  adjustment of  factor pro- 
portions.  In line  with the parameters chosen  for the model  above  and 
the empirical evidence  presented below,  I choose  a value of cr  equal to 
1.0 and a value of A equal to 0.8,  implying  a mean lag of four years in 
the adjustment of factor proportions to the wage.  Figure 8 plots labor 
demand shift  series  for these  values  of  cr and A, and for two  sets  of 
alternative values  of these parameters. 
The three series presented in the upper panel of figure 8 correspond 
to different values for X: 0.0  (corresponding to no costs of adjustment), 
0.8  (the benchmark), and 0.9;  in each case,  cr  is set equal to 1.0. Under 
the assumption  of  zero costs  of  adjustment,  the markup series  shows 
envelope computations.  For example, a decrease in the labor share from 0.7  to 0.6 
implies an increase  in the markup  of roughly 15 percent. 
31.  For a detailed discussion of this and other issues in the construction  of the 
markup,  see Rotemberg  and Woodford  (1998). Olivier J. Blanchard  121 
Figure 8. Labor Demand  Shifts under  Alternative  Elasticity  and Adjustment  Cost 
Assumptions,  France, 1968-95a 
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Source:  Author's  calculations  (see  figure  1). 
a. Figure  plots the log of the markup  (In 1), normalized  to equal zero in 1970. Using equation 11 in the text, In 1 is constructed 
as -In vA  -  (1/l)  In (tiy), where  v  is the elasticity of substitution,  n is effective labor,  and  y is output.  The series In  cv,,  in tum, is 
constructed  as  x  In wv, ,  +  (I  -  X)  In wv,, where  wv,  is  the  wage  in  efficiency  units  and  x  is  a parameter  capturing  the  speed  of 
adjustment  of factor  proportions. 
b. In each case,  ua  = 1. 
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large negative values beginning in the mid- 1970s and then turns positive 
in the mid- 1980s. But the other two graphs show that the initial decrease 
is  largely  spurious,  coming  from the  slow  adjustment of  firms away 
from labor in the face of the wage push. For X equal to 0.8,  the markup 
shows  a small decline  in the late  1970s  and a large increase  since  the 
late  1980s.  For A equal to 0.9,  the increase only  starts in  1990.  Note 
that in all three cases,  the value of the markup shift is large and positive 
at the end of  the period; the value  of  A affects  only  the timing  of the 
increase. 
The two graphs in the lower panel of figure 8 correspond to different 
values of cr: 1.0 (the benchmark) and 2.0.  In both cases,  A is set equal 
to 0.8.  The higher value of cr yields  a more pronounced decline  in the 
1980s and a smaller value of the shift at the end of the period. 
The series for the markup shifts is derived under the assumption that 
the production function is time invariant (up to Harrod-neutral techno- 
logical  progress);  in particular, ln(1  -  a)  is constant in equation  10. 
But these shifts could equally have been called technological  bias shifts, 
corresponding  to changes  in the coefficient  a,  with  ji  remaining con- 
stant. Equation  10 makes clear that if one looks only at labor demand, 
changes  in ln ji and changes  in  -  ln(1  -  a) are observationally  equiv- 
alent.  Thus one could equally  interpret figure 8 as showing  technolog- 
ical bias in favor of capital-an  increase in a-since  the mid-1980s.  I 
discuss  below  whether and how  one can use other evidence  to distin- 
guish between  the two explanations. 
SHIFTS IN  USER COST.  To  construct the time  series  for shifts  in the 
cost of capital (r  +  8),  I use the depreciation ("scrapping")  rate from 
OECD data for 8. I construct r in three different ways.  Figure 9 presents 
the resulting user cost series for France. 
In the series that I use for simulations  below,  I construct r as equal 
to the long nominal interest rate minus the average rate of inflation over 
the previous five years. This is labeled "bonds,  method 1" in figure 9. 
The second series uses the nominal interest rate minus the inflation rate 
over the previous  year,  and is labeled  "bonds,  method 2."  The third 
series,  "bonds  and equity,"  constructs the required rate of return as a 
weighted  average of the real interest rate on bonds-which,  in turn, is 
constructed  as the nominal  interest rate minus a five-year  average of 
inflation-and  of the required rate of return on equity-which  itself  is 
constructed  as the sum of  the ratio of dividends  to prices plus a five- ol~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. 
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year average of past output growth (an admittedly rough proxy for the 
expected  rate of  growth of  dividends).  The weights  are 0.7  on bond 
finance and 0.3  on equity finance. 
All three series show a low user cost in the 1970s,  a peak associated 
with disinflation in the early 1980s,  and another peak in the early 1990s, 
associated  with German reunification and the "Franc fort" policy.  The 
user  cost  using  one  year  of  lagged  inflation  rather than a  five-year 
average is higher during most of the 1980s and a little higher at the end 
of  the series.  The user cost  assuming  bond and equity  finance shows 
little trend and finishes lower than the other two series.  This is because 
the steady decrease in the ratio of dividends to prices and in the growth 
rate over the past fifteen years imply a steady decrease in the estimated 
required rate of return on equity over that period.32 
Simulating  the Model 
Figure  10 plots,  for France, the evolution  over 1970-96  of the profit 
rate, the wage rate per efficiency  unit, the ratio of the profit rate to the 
wage  rate (per efficiency  unit),  the ratio of  labor (again in efficiency 
units) to capital,  the capital share, and the unemployment  rate. These 
are the facts to be explained.  For ease of comparison,  I normalize each 
variable  to have  a  1970  value  equal to that in the steady  state of  the 
model.  Thus in  1970,  the profit rate is normalized  to 0.15,  the wage 
rate to 0.35,  the ratio of profit rate to wage  rate to 0.428,  the ratio of 
labor to capital to 1.0,  the capital share to 0.30,  and the unemployment 
rate to 0.0.  The basic evolutions  are by now familiar; in particular, the 
increases  in the capital share and in unemployment. 
The  simulations  described  below  assume  zero values  for the shifts 
before  1970  and actual values  thereafter. They  are run under rational 
expectations,  with expectations  of  future shifts  equal to their current 
values.  The corresponding  figures show  simulation  results under two 
alternative assumptions  about the value of a:  1.0 and 2.0. 
Figure 11 presents the results of a first simulation,  allowing for shifts 
in  labor  supply  and  the  cost  of  capital  but  ignoring  shifts  in  labor 
32.  I have so far ignored  the trend  decline in the relative  price of capital, which is 
absent  from  the model  above  but  is empirically  relevant  for a number  of OECD  countries. 
In France, however, this factor is not very important.  The relative  price of investment 
goods has decreased  by only 6 percent  since 1970. Olivier J. Blanchard  125 
Figure 10. Historical  Paths of Variables,  France, 1970-95 
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Figure 11. Simulated  Effects of Historical  Labor Supply and User Cost Shifts, 
France, 1970-96a 
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a. Graphs  show the paths that variables  follow in response to the constructed  labor supply and user cost shifts that occurred  in 
France over the sample period. The construction  of the time series of these shifts is described in the text and in the notes to 
figures  7 and 9; the user cost series is constructed  using long bond rates  deflated  by the inflation  rate  over the previous  five years. 
Solid line results when elasticity of substitution  (a) is set to one; dashed line, when elasticity is set to two. All other parameters 
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demand (markup or technological  bias  shifts).  It is clear the adverse 
labor supply shocks can explain the increases in unemployment and the 
capital share up to the mid-1980s.  But they  are unable to explain  the 
further increases in unemployment  and the capital share since the mid- 
1980s.  Instead, as labor supply shifts decrease in magnitude and factor 
proportions adjust, the ratio of labor to capital turns around, leading to 
reductions in unemployment  and the capital share. 
Figure  12 depicts  the effects  of  all three shifts combined.  It shows 
how  the  adverse  labor demand  shifts  since  the  early  1980s  help  to 
account  for the  subsequent  evolution  of  both unemployment  and the 
capital share. In contrast with the previous simulation,  the ratio of labor 
to capital declines  throughout the period (as it does in the data), despite 
the fact that due to the decrease in labor supply shifts and the downward 
pressure from unemployment,  the wage  (in efficiency  units)  is below 
its initial value.  Unemployment  remains high,  and so does the capital 
share.33 
A Glance  at Other Countries 
For the other thirteen countries in my sample,  I have carried out the 
same  exercise  mechanically,  without  any  attempt to  fine  tune,  even 
when the simulations  results are poor.  Fine tuning would take me be- 
yond the scope  of  this paper, and so I leave  it to later work.  Table 3 
summarizes the results.34 For each country, the table reports the change 
in constructed labor supply and labor demand shifts for the subperiods 
1970-81  and  1981-95.  And for each  subperiod and country,  it also 
gives  both the change  in the unemployment  rate implied by the simu- 
lation and the actual change.  To interpret the numbers for labor supply 
33.  The fit between the actual  evolutions in figure 10 and the simulated  evolutions 
in figure 12 is clearly very good. This, however, is largely  by construction.  Recall that 
the series for the labor  supply  and  demand  shifts are  constructed  so as to make  the labor 
supply  and  the labor  demand  relations  fit exactly. If the model  had  no internal  dynamics, 
the overall fit would be perfect. To the extent that the model determines  the dynamics 
of capital  accumulation  and  factor  proportions  endogenously,  the fit can still turn  out to 
be poor. Table  3 below, which  reports  the simulation  results  for each  of the other  thirteen 
countries in the sample, shows that predicted  unemployment  can differ substantially 
from actual  unemployment. 
34.  I was unable  to solve the model for Spain and the United Kingdom,  apparently 
because  of large negative real interest  rates in the mid-1970s. The simulations  reported 
for these countries  assume a constant  user cost. 128  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1997 
Figure 12. Simulated  Effects of Historical  Labor Supply and Demand  and User Cost 
Shifts, France,  1970-96a 
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a. Graphs  show the paths that variables  follow in response to the constructed  labor supply, labor demand,  and user cost shifts 
that occurred  in France  over the sample period.  The construction  of the time series of these shifts is described  in the text and in 
the notes to figures  7, 8, and 9. Solid line results  when elasticity of substitution  (a) is set to one; dashed  line, when elasticity is set 
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Table 3.  Labor  Supply  and Demand  Shifts and Implied  and Actual Unemployment 
Rate Changes,  1970-95a 
Percentage points 
1970-81  1981-95 
Change in  Change in 
Labor  Labor  unemployment  Labor  Labor  unemployment 
supply  demand  rate  supply  demand  rate 
Country  shift  shift  Implied  Actual  shift  shift  Implied  Actual 
Continental 
Australia  12  -4  5  4  -5  3  8  3 
Austria  23  0  13  1  0  6  5  4 
Denmark  22  0  15  8  -13  8  0  0 
France  16  -1  7  6  -10  11  3  4 
Germanyb  19  -6  6  5  -10  3  -2  -1 
Netherlands  7  -3  7  6  -12  8  -1  1 
Spainc  39  -5  20  13  -3  11  10  8 
Sweden  21  -3  9  2  -3  5  5  5 
Belgium  30  -9  17  9  -1  4  9  3 
Ireland  3  -3  -3  5  -18  8  -1  2 
Italy  6  -2  -4  3  -4  8  7  5 
Anglo-Saxon 
United States  -1  -3  -3  2  -4  0  -1  -2 
Canada  4  1  1  2  2  20  -4  22  1 
United Kingdomc  11  1  4  7  -10  -6  -4  0 
Source: Author's calculations, based on data used in table 1. 
a. Labor supply shifts are changes in In 0 times  100. Labor demand shifts are changes in the log of the markup (In p.) 
times 100. Both series are constructed as described in text and in notes to figures 7 and 8. Numbers shown in this table use 
=  I and A =  0.8.  Implied changes in the unemployment rate are taken from dynamic simulations using the constructed 
shifts in labor supply and demand and in user cost that occurred over the sample period, and the parameter  and steady-state 
values given in table 2. 
b. Sample period ends in 1990. 
c. Assuming constant real interest and depreciation rates. 
and demand shifts,  it is useful to recall that over a period of five to ten 
years, the effect  of  1 percent adverse shift in labor supply is to increase 
the unemployment  rate by about 0.8  percentage points.  Over the same 
period,  a  1 percent adverse shift in labor demand increases  the unem- 
ployment rate by about 0.4 percentage point. Table 3 suggests a number 
of conclusions. 
The model does a decent job of explaining unemployment evolutions 
across countries  and across  subperiods.  The cross-country  correlation 
between predicted and actual changes  in unemployment  is 0.60  for the 
first subperiod  and 0.36  (excluding  Canada,  0.65)  for  the  second 
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For a large number of  countries,  however,  the model  overpredicts 
the increase  in the unemployment  rate from  1970 to  1981.  The worst 
case is Austria, with a predicted increase of 13 percentage points versus 
an actual increase of only  1 percentage point.  Similarly,  the predicted 
increase  for Spain is substantially  larger than the already large actual 
increase.  The  origin  of  these  overpredictions  points  to  an important 
shortcoming  of the model.  The model assumes that each economy  was 
on its steady-state  growth path in 1970.  Starting from such a balanced 
path,  any increase  in the wage  above  that implied by total factor pro- 
ductivity growth must lead to higher unemployment.  But a country that 
is below its steady-state growth path experiences  an increase in the ratio 
of capital to labor, which allows  wages to grow faster than total factor 
productivity without adverse effects  on unemployment.  This appears to 
have been true of Austria,  where the profit rate was unusually high in 
the early 1970s and has declined steadily as the ratio of capital to output 
has increased.  Likewise  for Spain, although in this case the increase in 
wages  has been much larger than was warranted either by convergence 
to the steady-state  path or by factor productivity growth. 
Some other large discrepancies point to potential data issues as much 
as to deficiencies  of the model.  The proximate cause of the very large 
predicted increase in unemployment in Canada since 1981, for example, 
is  the large constructed  adverse  shift  in labor supply  since  that date. 
This  shift reflects wage  growth in excess  of low  measured total factor 
productivity.  The low measured factor productivity growth, in turn, can 
be  traced to  very  high  measured capital  growth  in the  1980s,  which 
leads to a small Solow  residual.  And the low measured capital growth 
comes  from a very large decrease  in the measured price of investment 
goods,  leading to high measured capital accumulation in volume,  given 
observed  capital  accumulation  in dollars.  According  to the data,  the 
relative price of capital goods has decreased more than twice  as fast in 
Canada as in the United States.  This does not seem plausible.35 
35.  The OECD is not to blame, as its data on the price of investment  goods are 
consistent  with those published  by Canada.  According  to Statistics  Canada,  the price of 
producer's  durable  equipment  relative to the GDP deflator  has decreased  from 100 in 
1970 to 33.8 in 1995 (compared  with 62.9 in the United  States, according  to the Bureau 
of Economic  Analysis). Part  of the problem  appears  to be the OECD's  use of an implicit 
price deflator for Canada, but a chain index for the United States. Canada  has now 
introduced  a chain index and its evolution is much  closer to that  of the United  States. I 
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Leaving  aside  such problems  and puzzles,  table 3 suggests  that the 
increase in unemployment  in the Continental countries is typically  ex- 
plained by adverse labor supply shifts in the first subperiod and adverse 
labor demand shifts  in the second.  Just as has been  seen  for France, 
these  later adverse  labor demand shocks  also  explain  the increase  in 
capital shares. It is interesting to note that the model suggests that labor 
demand  shifts  have  played  a  more  limited  role  in  Germany  than in 
France: most  of  the  decrease  and later recovery  of  capital  shares  in 
Germany  is  accounted  for simply  by  the dynamic  response  of  factor 
proportions to factor prices. 
Lags in Labor Demand 
In this  section,  I return to  econometrics  and look  at dynamics  of 
labor demand.  The  important role  played  by  these  dynamics  in  the 
analysis  so far raises two related questions.  First, is there evidence  for 
the lags  assumed  in the model and the construction of markup shifts? 
Second,  when such lags are allowed and estimated, how much evidence 
remains of shifts in labor demand since the mid-1980s?  There is a large 
literature on  the dynamics  of  labor demand in general,  and of  labor 
demand in the context of European unemployment,  in particular.36  My 
goal here is simply  to provide a description of the data and attempt to 
separate dynamics  and time effects. 
For each  of  the two  groups  of  countries-Continental  and Anglo- 
Saxon-I  run the following  panel regression: 
(12)  In (f) =  (U(L)  In vi,  +  xi  +  x,  +  Ei,, 
where i denotes  a country; t denotes time; fi is labor in efficiency  units; 
To see the potential  effects of shifting to a better  index, I have redone  the simulations 
for Canada  using the U.S. relative price of investment  instead  of the Canadian  one to 
compute  the evolution of the capital stock in volume, total factor productivity,  and so 
on. The labor supply shift for 1970-81 decreases from 4 (in table 3) to  -6,  and for 
1981-95,  from 20  to  10; the increase in the unemployment  rate over 1981-95  is 
12 percent-still  too high, but roughly  half the number  in the table. 
36.  On labor demand in general, see,  for example, Hammermesh  (1993); in the 
context of European  unemployment,  see, for example, Layard,  Nickell, and Jackman 
(1991). 132  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
Table 4.  Regressing  Factor Quantity  Ratios  on Current  and Lagged  Wage Rates, 
1961-95a 
Coefficient on wages 
Sum  p valuesb 
Panel and  Time  t -3  to  t -I  to  Lagged  Time 
estimator  dummies  Current  t-I  t-2  t -9  t -9  wages  dummies 
Continental 
OLS  No  -0.14  -0.51  -0.31  -1.31  -2.27  0.00  ... 
OLS  Yes  -0.74  -0.35  -0.30  -1.09  -2.47  0.00  0.00 
IVC  No  -0.51  -0.44  -0.44  -1.40  -2.79  0.00  ... 
IVC  Yes  -0.87  -0.37  -0.32  -1.13  -2.69  0.00  0.00 
Anglo-Saxon 
OLS  No  -1.19  -0.49  -0.16  -0.10  -1.94  0.00  ... 
OLS  Yes  -1.09  -0.34  -0.32  -0.20  -1.95  0.00  0.09 
IVC  No  -1.30  -0.47  -0.16  -0.03  -1.96  0.00 
IVC  Yes  -1.37  -0.33  -0.60  0.79  -1.51  0.00  0.05 
Source: Author's regressions (see table I). 
a. The dependent variable is the log factor quantity ratio, In (filk)j,, where ht is labor in efficiency units and k is the capital 
stock in country i and year t. Independent variables include current and lagged values of the log wage per efficiency unit, 
In wi,,  in addition to country and time fixed effects.  Equation estimated is ( 12) in the text. Samples are as described in notes 
to table I. 
b. Probability of obtaining these data given that all lagged wage or time dummy coefficients are zero. Covariance matrix 
is Newey-West corrected. 
c.  Estimated using constructed labor supply shifts (see figure 7),  lagged zero to nine years, as instruments for wages in 
efficiency  units. 
k is  capital;  wvi  is  the  wage  per efficiency  unit of  labor; xi and xt are 
country and time fixed effects,  respectively;  and +(L)  is a lag polyno- 
mial. As is well known, this log-log  specification does not hold exactly, 
except  in the  Cobb-Douglas  case-this  is  why  the  estimation  above 
relied  instead  on  a  log-log  relation  between  factor  price  and factor 
quantity ratios, which holds for the CES case-and  must be thought of 
as a log approximation.  Under that interpretation, the sum of estimated 
coefficients  on current and lagged wages,  4(1),  is approximately equal 
to the ratio of the elasticity  of substitution to the share of capital,  u/a. 
This fact is useful  for interpreting the results below. 
The results of  this estimation are reported in table 4  and figure 13. 
Table 4 presents four sets of results for each group. Two are obtained by 
ordinary least squares, with and without time dummies. The other two are 
obtained using instrumental variables, with and without time dummies. 
For the present purposes, the labor supply shifts constructed earlier are 
natural instruments.37  The regression results yield two conclusions. 
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Figure 13. Time  Variation  in Factor Quantity  Ratios, Controlling  for Wage  Rates, 
Continental  and Anglo-Saxon  Countries,  1963-95a 
Log index, 1970  = 0 
Continental 
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Source:  Author's  regressions,  based on data used in figure 1. 
a. Figure plots, for each panel of countries, the time dummy coefficients that result when the log ratio of labor to capital is 
regressed  on the current  log wage in efficiency units, country dummies, and time dummies. Where indicated, regression also 
includes  lagged values of the log effective wage. Regression  corresponds  to equation 12 in the text and is described  in the notes to 
table  4; the figure  presents  results  from the instrumental  variables  estimation. 134  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
First, there is evidence  of long lags in labor demand. While the best 
lag  length  varies  across  specifications,  the results  suggest  that up to 
nine  years  are needed  to capture the dynamics  of  adjustment.  If one 
takes the average  capital  share to equal 0.35,  the sum of  coefficients 
on current and lagged wages implies an elasticity  of substitution a little 
under 1.0,  which  is unable to yield  a significant medium-run increase 
in the capital share in response to adverse labor supply shifts. 
Second,  even allowing  for lags,  time dummies remain highly signif- 
icant for the Continental countries,  but are only  marginally so for the 
Anglo-Saxon  countries.  More information is given  in figure 13, which 
plots the series of time fixed effects estimated by instrumental variables, 
for each group.  For comparison,  it also plots the series of time effects 
from  a  regression  that  allows  only  for  current wages-and  country 
dummies.  For the Anglo-Saxon  countries,  the shifts are small,  whether 
or not one allows  for lags in labor demand. For the Continental coun- 
tries,  allowing  for lags reduces the size  of shifts in the 1970s but does 
not otherwise change the general shape of the shifts: there is still a large 
unexplained  adverse  shift  in labor demand increasing  from the early 
1980s to the present. 
The Source of Shifts in Labor Demand 
A key unanswered question is whether the source of the labor demand 
shifts  lies  in  technological  bias  away  from  labor  or changes  in  the 
distribution of rents. A similar question has been discussed  in the con- 
text of  the shift in demand for skilled  relative to unskilled  labor.  The 
prevalent  view  is that this shift reflects technological  bias away from 
unskilled  workers.  But  some  argue  that  it  may  reflect  institutional 
change; for example,  the weakening of unions leading to an increase in 
between the ratio of labor (in efficiency units) to capital and the wage (in efficiency 
units), due either to deviations of the marginal  product  from the wage or to mismea- 
surement  of total  factor  productivity.  A demand-driven  boom is typically  associated  with 
high measured  total  factor  productivity  growth.  High  measured  productivity  growth  leads 
to a large increase  in labor  measured  in efficiency units (fi) and a large decrease  in the 
wage per efficiency unit (w). In order  to alleviate some of the business  cycle effects, I 
have tried using only values of the labor supply shifts lagged by three or more years. 
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wage  differentials  across  workers.38 The approach in this debate has 
been to look at cross-country  or cross-sectoral  evidence  and try to link 
the shifts to factors that are more likely associated with one or the other 
explanation.  For the question at hand, there would appear to be a more 
direct approach. Under the hypothesis of technological  bias, one should 
see changes in the production function; under the hypothesis of changes 
in markups, one should not. This suggests  a simple test. 
Consider the following example. Suppose that the production function 
is Cobb-Douglas, with exponent a on capital, and that except for possible 
changes in a over time, technological progress is multiplicative: 
(13)  y  =  z (4, n)('alc  ka, 
where  4, is  a  constant  that  depends  on  the  units  in  which  labor  is 
measured.  One  typically  ignores  units  in production  functions,  as  a 
change  in units merely  changes  the constant term. But in the present 
context,  where one wants to allow  for changes  in a,  the units do make 
a difference:  one does  not want the effect  on y of a given  change in a 
to depend on whether labor is measured in thousands or in millions  of 
workers. 
Suppose  that the markup is  equal  to  pL  and assume  away  costs  of 
adjustment, so that the wage times the markup is equal to the marginal 
product of  labor.  It is  straightforward to derive that the capital  share 
will  be equal to ox  1  -  (1I/V)(1 -  a).  Assume  that, initially,  pL  is 
equal to one,  so that ot is equal to a. 
Suppose that one observes an increase in the share of capital, (x. This 
could  be due to one  of  two  factors  (or a combination  of  them).  One 
hypothesis  (HO) is  that it comes  from technological  bias; that is,  an 
increase  in  a,  reflected  one  for  one  in  an increase  in  o(. The  other 
hypothesis  (HI)  is that it comes  from an increase  in the markup,  pL, 
increasing ot given  an unchanged value of a,  denoteda. 
Under HO, the production function is given  by 
y  =  z N,  n)  k-. 
Or, taking logs  and rewriting, 
n()  (1  -  ct) ln()  +  (1  -  co) ln 4, +  ln z. 
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Similarly,  under HI  the production function is given  by 
y  =  z (4 n)( I-  )  kTi. 
Or, taking logs  and rewriting, 
n()  (1  aI) ln()  +  (I  -  I) ln q,  +  ln  z. 
In essence,  under HO the change  in the share should be reflected in a 
change in the effect  of the ratio of labor to capital on the ratio of output 
to capital; under HI  it should not. 
One can nest these two hypotheses  by writing 
n()  =  4(1  -  ot) ln(  )  +  (1-  4))(1 -  In)  in(k) 
+  [4(1  -  oX) +  (1  - +)(1  -a-]ln  t4 +  ln z. 
Or, rearranging, 
(14)  ln(k)  -  (1  I)  n() 
=(  -  o)  ln(  )  +  [1  -  (I  -(1  -  4)a]  ln 4  +  ln z. 
A value of 4 equal to zero implies that the change in the share is due 
to markup changes.  A value of 4 equal to one implies  that the change 
in the share is due to biased technological  progress. 
Estimating equation 14 requires the specification of z, the technolog- 
ical  level.39 I assume  that ln z;, (for country i at time  t) is equal to a 
country-specific  quadratic trend, f,(t),  plus a stationary component,  Ei,. 
If one assumes  that -a, the underlying constant value of a under HI,  is 
equal to the mean value of the share in the sample,  one can construct 
the time  series  for the dependent  variable,  X1  [ln(ylk)  -  (1  --a) 
ln(nlk)],  and  the  first  right-hand-side  variable,  X2  --  [(a--  o) 
ln(nlk)],  and run the following  panel regression: 
39.  In  this case, it is not possible  to express  variables  in efficiency  units  and  eliminate 
z from the regression,  as I have done above, because the weights needed  to construct  z 
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Table  5.  Regressions  to Distinguish  between  Technological  Bias and Markup 
Changes, Fourteen-Country  Panel, 1961-95a 
Estimated  technological  p value: 
Estimator  bias  parameterb  equality  across countriesc 
OLS  0.98  0.03 
(0.17) 
IVId  1.47  0.00 
(0.35) 
1V2e  0.69  0.73 
(0.39) 
Source: Author's regressions (see table 1). 
a. Equations estimated correspond to ( 15) in the text. Sample includes both Continental and Anglo-Saxon countries; for 
details, see notes to table 1. 
b. The coefficient 4  from equation 15. A value of zero implies that changes in capital shares are due to markup  changes; 
of one implies that they are due to biased technological change. 
c.  Probability of obtaining these data if the parameter  4  is the same across countries. 
d. Estimated using current and lagged values of constructed labor supply shifts (see figure 7) as instruments. 
e.  Estimated using current and lagged values of user cost (see figure 9) as instruments. 
(15)  XI,i  =  +  X2i, +  xi  +  p(xj,,  +  f(t)  +  Eit. 
Table 5 presents the results of this estimation.  All fourteen countries 
are pooled together, as there is no obvious reason to treat the two groups 
separately in this context.40 The first line gives  the results of ordinary 
least  squares estimation,  reporting the estimated  value  of 4)  and also 
the test  of  the constraint that when  allowed  to differ,  4)i  is  the same 
across countries.  The second and third lines report the results of instru- 
mental variable estimation;  the second  uses  current and lagged  labor 
supply  shifts,  whereas the third uses  current and lagged  shifts  in user 
cost.  To the extent that the user cost is dominated by movements in the 
world interest rate, it is a good candidate instrument. 
Point estimates of 4)  are significantly closer to one than to zero. This 
argues for technological  bias (which corresponds to 4)  =  1) rather than 
markups. Allowing  for country-specific  values of 4),  however,  yields  a 
wide  range of  estimated  values,  from  -  2.5  to 4.0.  These  have large 
standard deviations:  equality of all 4)'s is rejected only at the 3 percent 
level  in the ordinary least squares case,  and is not rejected at all in the 
second  instrumental variables case. 
The  great variation  in the coefficient  4),  across  countries-even  if 
40.  The results are very similar  if only the Continental  countries  are used. The test 
has little power for the Anglo-Saxon countries, because their shares do not vary very 
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the  variation  is  not  always  significant-makes  me  uneasy  about the 
results in table 5. One reason for the variation may be that the assump- 
tions  underlying  this  approach (a Cobb-Douglas  production  function 
and no costs of adjustment, so that the share is the right measure of the 
effect  of  capital  on  output  under HO) are overly  strong.  I  suspect, 
however,  that aggregate  data may  not be able  to  speak precisely.  In 
effect,  the question  is whether,  given  total factor productivity,  an in- 
crease in the ratio of labor to capital has a larger effect  on the ratio of 
output  to  capital  in  those  countries  where  the  capital  share has  in- 
creased.  But little is known about the exact process of factor productiv- 
ity, nor are there large changes in the ratio of labor to capital that would 
yield  sharp estimates.  Thus further progress will probably have to rely 
on the cross-sectoral  evidence. 
Conclusions 
In the  1970s,  most  of  the  Continental  countries  were  affected  by 
large  adverse  shifts  in labor supply.  The  initial  effect  of  these  shifts 
was to decrease profit rates and capital shares. Over time,  firms reacted 
by moving  away from labor,  which  led to a steady increase  in unem- 
ployment  and the recovery of capital shares. In most of these countries 
labor supply  shifts  have now  abated, and in some  they have vanished 
altogether.  But since  the early  1980s,  they have been replaced by ad- 
verse  shifts in labor demand. These  shifts explain why unemployment 
has remained high,  and also explain the further rise in capital shares. 
By contrast,  the Anglo-Saxon  countries have largely been shielded 
from  both the  adverse  labor supply  shifts  of  the  1970s  and the later 
labor demand shifts.  This accounts for their different evolutions-both 
in terms of  unemployment  and in terms of  capital  shares-from  the 
Continental countries. 
These  findings  yield  a mixed  message  for the future course  of  un- 
employment  in the Continental countries.  On the one hand, labor mod- 
eration-defined  as  the  disappearance  of  the  adverse  labor  supply 
shifts-may  no  longer  be  sufficient  to  ensure  a quick  return to  low 
unemployment.  On the other hand, one should expect that the adverse 
effects  of  labor demand shifts  on unemployment  will  disappear over 
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offset  by  the  entry  of  new  firms  and  an  increase  in  capital.  Thus, 
assuming no further adverse labor demand shifts (which is more likely 
to hold  if  such  shifts  come  from changes  in the distribution of  rents 
than if they come  from technological  bias),  my results  imply  a slow 
decline  in unemployment  in the future. 
Even  if  the story presented  in this paper is broadly correct,  many 
questions need to be examined before forecasts or policy  advice can be 
given  with much confidence.  I discuss  two of  these  here.4' First,  can 
one relate shifts  in labor supply and demand to underlying observable 
variables? Identifying  the source of the adverse shifts  in labor supply 
may be the easiest  part, as it builds on a large body of research. There 
is wide  consensus  that these  shifts  come  both from a combination  of 
economic  events  (such as increases in oil prices,  the slowdown  in total 
factor productivity growth) and induced changes  in labor market insti- 
tutions (such as more generous  treatment of unemployment,  increases 
in employment protection,  minimum wage legislation).  One of the puz- 
zles  faced  by  previous  research  was  how  to  reconcile  the  fact  that 
unemployment  has remained high while oil price hikes have been more 
than reversed,  workers by now must have adapted to slower underlying 
productivity  growth,  unions  appear to have become  weaker,  and gov- 
ernments have started tightening  social  insurance programs. My find- 
ings that labor supply shifts have indeed largely decreased,  and that the 
persistence  of high unemployment  is a result of shifts in labor demand 
since the mid- 1980s,  offer a resolution to the puzzle.  Indeed, the paper 
makes a more general methodological  point.  Much of the econometric 
research  on  the  increase  in  unemployment  has  involved  estimating, 
across countries and time,  a reduced-form equation for the unemploy- 
ment rate as a function of a number of observable variables.42 I suggest 
41.  Those who have read an early version of the present  paper  (Blanchard,  1996) 
may note the absence of a theme developed there: the relation  between inflation  and 
markups.  My initial work showed a strong  time-series  relation  between  the increase  of 
the measured  markup  and the decrease in inflation. Now that I have adjusted  the con- 
struction  of markups  to take into account  lags of adjustment  of factor proportions,  the 
relation  remains  but is weaker. And when time effects are allowed in panel regressions 
of factor  prices on factor  quantities,  domestic  inflation  for each country  is only margin- 
ally significant. For these reasons, I have left the exploration  of a potential relation 
between  markups  and inflation  to further  work. 
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instead a potentially  more productive  approach: to distinguish  supply 
and demand shifts and then try to explain each of them separately. 
Identifying  the source  of  the more recent labor demand shifts  may 
be more difficult.  The attempt to distinguish  between  shifts in the dis- 
tribution of  rents  and biased  technological  adoption  in  this  paper is 
inconclusive.  As  a next  step,  I have  started looking  at cross-sectoral 
evidence  for France. I find that labor demand shifts are present in most 
sectors,  but I have not yet made progress in relating relative  shifts  to 
potential underlying factors,  such as the initial level  of rents, the esti- 
mated initial degree of labor hoarding, the initial structure of bargain- 
ing,  and so on. 
There may also  be something  to be learned from the cross-country 
evidence.  Based on the numbers in table 3, the cross-country correlation 
between  the labor supply  shifts  over  1970-81  and the labor demand 
shifts since  1981 is 0.40:  countries that had larger adverse labor supply 
shifts  in the  1970s typically  have also suffered larger adverse demand 
shifts since.  It is tempting to see this relation as causal.  Firms in coun- 
tries where labor supply shifts were stronger may have decided to adopt 
technologies that use less labor and more capital. The lags in introducing 
these  new  technologies  may be even  longer than those associated with 
43  changing factor proportions within the set of existing technologies. 
This correlation between labor supply shifts and labor demand shifts 
also  suggests  a tentative  explanation  for the differences  between  the 
experiences  of the Anglo-Saxon  and the Continental countries.  In the 
Anglo-Saxon  countries,  the  slowdown  in  productivity  growth  was 
smaller,  and the induced  adjustment of  labor market institutions  was 
more  limited.  Building  on  the  argument of  the  previous  paragraph, 
smaller adverse labor supply shifts from 1970 to 1981 may then explain 
why adverse shifts in labor demand have also been more limited since 
1981. 
The second  question  that must be answered is: what is the relation 
of the shifts between  labor and capital documented in this paper to the 
shifts between skilled and unskilled labor documented in recent research 
in labor economics?  It is an intriguing fact that relative demand shifts 
between  skilled and unskilled workers appear to have been particularly 
43.  A number  of recent  papers  tell of endogenous  bias in technology  adoption  along 
broadly  related  lines; see, for example, Acemoglu (1997) and Zeira  (forthcoming). Olivier J. Blanchard  141 
strong  in the  Anglo-Saxon  countries,  and relative  demand shifts  be- 
tween  labor and capital appear to have been particularly strong in the 
Continental countries.  One wonders whether there may be an integrated 
explanation; whether the Anglo-Saxon  countries have seen a shift from 
unskilled workers to skilled workers, whereas the Continental countries 
have seen a shift from unskilled  workers to capital. 
A preliminary look at numbers, however,  does not seem to indicate 
that the increase in the capital share in the Continental countries since 
the early  1980s  has come  primarily at the expense  of unskilled  labor. 
Data for France constructed by Jean Pierre Laffargue and Anne Saint- 
Martin, for example,  imply that the decrease in the labor share from 68 
percent in 1982 to 58 percent in 1990 has come not only from a reduc- 
tion  from  10 percent  to  7  percent  in the  share of  unskilled  workers 
(defined as blue collar workers plus unskilled employees),  but also from 
a reduction  of  the  share  of  skilled  workers,  from  58  percent  to  51 
percent.44 In general,  the data from France and other countries appear 
to suggest  two largely unrelated evolutions:  a general and steady shift 
away  from unskilled  labor and,  in  continental  Europe,  a shift  away 
from labor as a whole  since  the early  1980s.  A  next  step  will  be to 
extend the exercise  of this paper to three factors of production: skilled 
workers,  unskilled  workers,  and capital. 
44.  Laffargue  and Saint-Martin  (1997). I thank  Jean Pierre Laffargue  for making 
those data  available  to me. Comments 
and Discussion 
William  D. Nordhaus:  In this paper, Olivier Blanchard struggles with 
one of the major puzzles of current macroeconomics.  Why do the econ- 
omies  of Europe and North America look so different? The paper con- 
tains many interesting insights and a few remaining puzzles.  I organize 
my comments  around three topics: the facts,  the model,  and the expla- 
nations. 
Begin  with the facts,  which concern the returns to capital and labor. 
Blanchard examines  the capital share and the relative returns to labor 
and capital  in a number of  OECD countries.  He concentrates  on the 
business  sector.  The major findings are the following:  First, the behav- 
ior of factor shares looks  quite different in the "Anglo-Saxon"  coun- 
tries of the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom from in the 
continental  European countries  of Germany,  France,  Italy,  and Spain 
(Blanchard's  list of Continental countries is longer,  but nothing is lost 
by  focusing  on  these  four).  Whereas  capital  shares  have  been  quite 
stable in the Anglo-Saxon  countries,  in the Continental countries,  they 
fell  sharply in the  1970s  and then have risen even  more sharply since 
the early 1980s.  Second,  as is well known, unemployment trends differ 
in the two groups of countries.  Unemployment  is roughly trendless in 
the United  States,  while  it has been increasing  steadily  in continental 
Europe. 
I see no reason to quarrel with the basic facts,  although the business 
sector is an unfortunate target for this kind of analysis.  It contains too 
much that muddies  the statistical  picture if one really  is interested  in 
the return to  capital.  For example,  in the United  States  the business 
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sector  contains  the  services  to  owner-occupied  housing,  earnings  of 
proprietorships, government enterprises,  and farming. For 1995, in the 
corporate  sector  the  share of  labor  in  national  income  (or,  national 
output at factor cost)  was  80  percent.  In the proprietor's sector,  that 
share was  32  percent,  while  in  "other  private  business"-which  is 
primarily the imputed profit that you  and I get  renting our houses  to 
ourselves-the  share of  labor was  3.4  percent.  These  animals  are so 
different  that I would  keep  them in different  cages  for the statistical 
analysis.  And one sometimes  forgets that the profits of financial insti- 
tutions include the seigniorage  earned by the Federal Reserve. 
As  long  as one  is beating up on the data, it is useful  to remember 
that the denominator of these return numbers is the net stock of repro- 
ducible  capital  at replacement  cost.  And  the  numerator includes  not 
only the implicit  return on owned capital but also any return to owned 
land, subsoil assets like oil deposits,  intangibles,  and goodwill,  as well 
as  any monopoly  power  or excessive  managerial  compensation;  fur- 
thermore,  it omits  the  substantial  capital  losses  on  capital  that have 
been experienced  in recent years.  It is interesting to note that the post- 
tax return is close to the weighted average cost of capital for this period. 
Just for fun,  I have compared the data on U.S.  rates of  return and 
shares for nonfinancial  corporations  taken from the National  Income 
and Product Accounts  (NIPA)  with  Blanchard's  U.S.  data from  the 
OECD.  The  property  share and rate of  return data are significantly 
different.  Blanchard's share and rate of return series show statistically 
significant  positive  time trends, whereas the NIPA data show  statisti- 
cally  significant negative time trends. Over the 1960-95  period,  Blan- 
chard's estimated rate of return rises from 11.2 percent to 17.7 percent, 
but the  NIPA  return falls  from  8.6  to  8.2  percent;  and Blanchard's 
estimated  share of  property income  rises  from  27.3  percent  to  33.3 
percent, but the NIPA share falls from 19.6 to 17. 1 percent. The NIPA 
data are clearly a cleaner concept for these purposes,  but I am puzzled 
by  the  difference.  Most  of  that difference  comes  from  the  fact  that 
Blanchard includes depreciation,  which seems ill advised in an analysis 
of  trends in  factor  shares  and rewards.  Moreover,  it does  not  make 
much sense to apply stories about labor rigidities,  biased technological 
change,  labor unions,  labor hoarding,  and constraints  on  hiring  and 
firing to owner-occupied  housing or sole proprietorships run by neuro- 
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erty income of nonfinancial corporations in different countries, but until 
that is shown,  my enthusiasm will  remain somewhat dampened. 
Because  profits are such  an intoxicating  topic,  consider  two  other 
points.  First, what has happened to the post-tax corporate rate of return 
in recent years? Complete  data are available only through 1995,  but it 
might come  as a surprise that the rate of return is basically  trendless. 
In fact,  the  1995  post-tax  return of  6.0  percent was  only  marginally 
above the 1960-95  average of 5.7 percent. There is no brave new world 
of  capitalism  in the rate of  return data-but  no falling  rate of  profit 
either. What has happened to the average tax rate on corporate capital, 
however,  is  striking.  After the corporate tax rate had averaged about 
35  percent  from  1965  through  1980,  the  supply-side  revolutionaries 
lowered  it to 20 percent in 1982,  and it had only risen to 26 percent as 
of  1995.  If Arthur Laffer had been paid his marginal private product as 
chairman of the tax-cutting committee of corporate America,  he would 
have earned $350  billion  in the 1980s alone. 
Blanchard accounts for these strange developments  in capital shares 
and profit rates by developing  an interesting  new  calibrated model  of 
the medium run and then using  it,  along with some  simple economet- 
rics,  to  compare  his  theory  with  developments  in the two  groups  of 
countries.  His  model  has four features.  First,  there is a conventional 
production structure, in which output is produced by a Cobb-Douglas 
(or sometimes,  a CES) production function in capital and labor. Second, 
there is a reduced-form labor supply relationship,  in which the employ- 
ment rate depends on the real wage.  Third, there is a price markup over 
labor costs,  which  in the model reflects multiple little monopolies,  so 
that the markup is determined by the price elasticity of demand. Fourth, 
there  is  a  novel  set  of  assumptions  regarding  firms and  adjustment 
dynamics  for firms, capital,  and labor. 
In the long run, the model behaves like standard supply and demand 
functions  for  labor.  (Just  to protect  everyone's  reputation  here,  I 
should-although  I do not-use  quotation marks each time I write labor 
supply and labor demand because,  as Blanchard emphasizes,  these are 
not the usual competitive  functions,  but reflect more complicated  mar- 
ket structures, institutional details,  and so forth.) The new twist is that 
labor supply determines the employment  rate, or employment  relative 
to  a benchmark  level  of  employment,  which  is  a moderately  elastic 
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demand for labor is an infinitely elastic  function of the real wage rate; 
the  labor demand  curve  shifts  down  with  an increase  in  the  rate of 
interest, the rate of capital taxation, the depreciation rate, and the Cobb- 
Douglas  share of  capital.  The steady-state  properties are that adverse 
or upward shifts  in labor supply  have no effect  on real wages  but do 
increase  the  "unemployment  rate."  Adverse  or downward  shifts  in 
labor demand are fully  reflected in a lower real wage and also produce 
a steady-state  change in the unemployment  rate. 
Blanchard uses the model to simulate the impact of different shocks 
to the system.  He suggests  that Continental countries  suffered from a 
series of adverse labor supply shifts in the 1970s.  These would clearly 
lead to  increases  in the unemployment  rate.  (Be  warned that the un- 
employment  rate is a mixture of  voluntary unemployment,  efficiency 
wage and wait unemployment,  and classical  unemployment,  but no real 
cyclical  unemployment  of the Keynesian  variety.)  Blanchard's  model 
also  shows  that these  shocks  lead to a decrease  in capital  shares,  al- 
though  I am not convinced  that this  result  is  robust to  changing  the 
modeling  dynamics. 
The new piece  of the story concerns the last decade.  Since the early 
1980s,  according to Blanchard, continental Europe has suffered a num- 
ber of adverse labor demand shocks.  There is some question in his mind 
as to whether these represented biased technological  change or shifts in 
the markup, although his econometrics  leads him to the conclusion  that 
they  are likely  to  have  been  biased  technological  change,  which  in- 
creased  the  Cobb-Douglas  coefficient  on  capital.  As  for  the  Anglo- 
Saxon world, Blanchard writes: "By contrast, the 'Anglo-Saxon'  coun- 
tries appear to have been largely shielded  from both the adverse labor 
supply shifts of the 1970s and the labor demand shifts of the 1980s and 
1990s.  This accounts for the differences  from the Continental countries 
in the evolution  of unemployment  and of capital shares." 
I conclude  by reflecting on which of the explanations  for these phe- 
nomena seem plausible  and consistent  with the cross-section  of human 
experience.  To  do  so,  I round up both the usual  suspects  and those 
chosen  by  Blanchard.  The  augmented  list  of  suspects  comprises  the 
business  cycle,  the cost  of capital,  markups and market power,  inter- 
national trade, biased technological  change,  and labor market rigidities. 
On the issue of the business  cycle,  profits and profit rates are highly 
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United States,  but given  the great depression  in continental Europe,  it 
can hardly explain  the rising  capital  share and rate of  profit there.  I 
would have liked some attention to cyclical  issues,  but given the paper's 
focus  on the medium term, this is a pardonable offense. 
The paper does not discuss  the cost of capital or increases in capital 
taxation as possible  reasons for the higher profit rate or capital share. 
It would,  in fact,  be  hard to  make  this  case  given  the  stock  market 
boom,  the unprecedented rise in Tobin's  q,  and the declining  tax rate 
of  corporate  capital  around the  world.  So  this  suspect  is  let  off  the 
hook. 
Blanchard  has  some  kind  words  to  say  about the  possibility  that 
higher capital shares in the Continental countries resulted from higher 
markups.  I  find  this  part of  the  discussion  confusing.  Blanchard's 
markup is,  by  definition,  the ratio of  price to marginal cost.  (By  the 
way,  this is different from the usual markup-that  is,  the relationship 
between price and some measure of standardized average cost-as  it is 
generally  used  by industrial firms or recognized  by those  responsible 
for the marking up.)  Under the usual simplified  conditions,  the Blan- 
chard markup is the usual function of the price elasticity  of demand. If 
one  is to take his model  literally  (which  he does  not),  the implication 
is that the increase in the capital share is due to an increase in monopoly 
power or a decrease in the demand elasticity  in Europe. This idea would 
be immediately  thrown out of court, and rightly so.  If anything,  com- 
petition has grown in continental Europe as a result of increasing open- 
ness to international trade. If anything, the movement to a single market 
should  drive  down  Blanchard markups in Europe relative  to those  in 
the United  States,  which  unified  its market two  centuries  ago.  There 
may  be  different  interpretations of  the  markup, but the obvious  one 
would  seem to be unrealistic on prima facie  grounds. 
In terms of the impact of increased openness  on different countries, 
there has been much debate about the effect  on the structure of wages, 
and, on balance,  the evidence  seems  to suggest  that unskilled  labor (a 
close  substitute  for inputs that are abundant in developing  countries) 
has had its wages  depressed.  Little attention has been paid to the ben- 
eficiaries  of  the increased  imports.  The usual view  is that the capital 
and skilled  labor of  the OECD are relatively  scarce in the world as a 
whole,  and that these factors should benefit from increased openness. 
I would  emphasize,  instead,  that the really  scarce factor in the world Olivier J. Blanchard  147 
economy  is able and ruthless managerial talent in multinational corpo- 
rations.  If so,  the opening  of  high-income  markets over the past two 
decades has had the effect  of increasing the return and share of capital 
income  in large corporations.  Moreover,  to the extent that Europe was 
closed  relative to the United States,  profits will  have been more bene- 
fited in that region than in the United States. 
Blanchard puts forward the novel  argument that the rise in capital's 
share in continental  Europe is due to biased  technological  change.  In 
his  framework,  biased  technological  change  is  simply  an increase  in 
the Cobb-Douglas  coefficient  on capital in the production function. This 
argument strikes me as completely  implausible.  To the extent that this 
is technological  change rather than substitution,  one would expect it to 
affect  almost  all  comparable  countries,  including  those  classified  as 
Anglo-Saxon.  What are these German labor-saving inventions that have 
not crossed the English Channel? Has a French chef discovered a labor- 
saving  recipe  for pommes frites  that has  not  yet  been  translated by 
McDonald's?  Martin Baily  and his associates  at the McKinsey  Global 
Institute have uncovered evidence  that continental Europe has actually 
lagged  behind  the  United  States  and Japan in  introducing  the  latest 
technologies  over the past decade or so.  Lagging behind hardly seems 
a likely  route for a region-specific  burst of technological  change. 
A more  promising  line  of  argument  about  biased  technological 
change  would  look  to the information  and computer revolution.  The 
use of computers could easily  be seen  as capital saving  (lowering  the 
ratio of capital to output) through the increased efficiency  in manage- 
ment of  production.  The miraculous  ways  in which  computers  allow 
better management of  airline,  railroad, and trucking fleet,  of  oil  refi- 
neries,  of  overnight  delivery  services,  and of  inventories  are  well 
known.  There is, however,  only weak evidence  of a decline in the ratio 
of chain-weighted  capital to output for the United States. 
The  final issue  concerns  institutional  labor market policies,  which 
seem  closest  to what Blanchard calls  labor supply shocks.  In this cat- 
egory  are union density  and coverage,  benefit levels  and the duration 
of unemployment  insurance and welfare  policies,  the strength of em- 
ployment  protection  and limitations  on separations,  and the structure 
and level  of labor and other taxes.  I believe  that it is here, rather than 
along linguistic  or geographical  lines,  that one might find the source of 
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Saxon countries are actually a subset of those with relatively free labor 
markets; his  Continental  countries  are high  on the  list  of  those  with 
major  labor  market rigidities.  For  example,  consider  the  following 
OECD ratings. Ranked on unemployment protection-using  an inverse 
French grading scale,  where  1 affords the least employment  protection 
(the United  States)  and 20  affords the most (Italy)-the  three Anglo- 
Saxon  countries  have  an average  score  3.7,  while  France,  Germany, 
Italy,  and Spain average  16.5.  On the labor standards rating (a scale 
from 0 to 7),  the Anglo-Saxon  countries average 0.7,  while these four 
Continental  countries  average  6.5.  In terms of  unemployment  insur- 
ance,  these four Continental countries have a generosity  rate (replace- 
ment  rate times  maximum  duration) of  180 percent-years,  while  the 
Anglo-Saxon  countries average 79 percent-years, a difference of almost 
2 1/2 times. ' It would therefore be more plausible to classify  the Anglo- 
Saxon countries as the "FreeLabs"  (those with largely free labor mar- 
kets) and the Continental countries as the "RegLabs"  (those with heav- 
ily regulated labor markets). 
This distinction  would resolve  half of the distributional puzzle,  that 
concerning  the labor market, but the profit puzzle  remains unsolved. 
Unless  the elasticity  of substitution of capital for labor is greater than 
one,  there is no simple and robust story about why the RegLabs would 
experience  increasing  profit rates or capital  shares  while  these  were 
relatively  stable in the FreeLabs.  There may be lots of unemployment 
in Europe, but there is still much work to be done by future Brookings 
Panels on this fascinating  and important issue. 
Edmund  S. Phelps:  The main advance of this paper is that it introduces 
wage and markup behavior explicitly  into the analysis of the evolution 
of  unemployment  together  with  that of  factor  shares.  To  date,  most 
economists  have been doing  reduced-form analyses  of the unemploy- 
ment  rate  with  only  an  implicit  consideration  of  wage  rates.  Since 
looking  at  wages  and  factor  shares  provides  a  useful  check  on  the 
consensus  explanation  of the rise of European unemployment,  this is a 
very worthwhile  exercise.  The real importance of the paper, however, 
lies  at the  level  of  theory  wars.  Blanchard,  who  used  to  stick  to  a 
Keynesian  approach  fortified  by  hysteresis  in  dealing  with  secular 
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change in unemployment,  seems now to have switched,  as have several 
others,  to  the  intertemporal equilibrium  endogenous  natural rate ap- 
proach,  in which neither money nor hysteresis  is required. 
I want,  first, to explain  that Blanchard's  results are in line with the 
consensus  that has emerged  on the rise of  unemployment  in Europe. 
Even  the equational  model  is based  on off-the-shelf  theoretical  com- 
ponents,  such as incentive  wage models underpinning the wage curve. 
Unfortunately these foundations are sometimes obscured or even obfus- 
cated-for  example,  when  the wage  curve  is  called  "labor  supply" 
(Blanchard's quotation marks). Second,  I argue that the paper seriously 
misleads  when it portrays the experience  of the "Anglo-Saxon"  coun- 
tries as radically different from that of the core Continental countries. 
The existence  of  a consensus  on European unemployment  is dem- 
onstrated by the symposium  forthcoming  in the May  1998 issue of the 
Economic  Journal,  and can be outlined  as follows.  Early in the con- 
vergence  of  views,  most  investigators  came  to believe  that the  large 
expansion  of  the welfare  state in the  1960s  and 1970s  had shifted  up 
the wage curve above where it would otherwise  have been by the mid- 
1970s,  which,  taken alone,  must have raised the natural rate of unem- 
ployment.  Since  welfare  entitlements-the  various  social  insurance 
and social  assistance  programs-were  generally  not contingent  on the 
beneficiary  being employed,  they operated to devalue  earning; the re- 
sulting deterioration of employee  performance (that is,  more quitting, 
shirking,  absenteeism,  and  so  forth  at  a  given  unemployment  rate) 
directly raised employee  costs,  as employers  raised wages  to shore up 
employee  incentives,  or accepted lower performance, or both. Further, 
the increase in payroll taxes that financed this expansion of welfare also 
pushed up the wage  curve in terms of  hourly labor costs-wage  and 
nonwage costs.  The reason is that the after-tax wage rates required for 
optimum incentives  will  not drop sufficiently  to accommodate  the tax 
as long  as the private wealth  and social  entitlements  of workers have 
not fallen in proportion to the decline in the after-tax wage.  Only in the 
long run, as wealth decumulates  in response to the decline  in the after- 
tax wage,  might there be a full accommodation  of the downward shift 
in the after-tax demand wage.  Indeed,  it is possible  that one is seeing 
the fruits of such an accommodation  in the 1990s. 
The two energy price shocks of the 1970s could also have pushed up 
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employment in nations where domestic workers' real private wealth and 
real entitlements  did not fall in proportion to the drop in their marginal 
productivity,  either because these workers owned shares in energy firms 
or because  the government owned or taxed energy. 
In the latest stage of the consensus,  it has become accepted that some 
portion of the rise of unemployment  in continental Europe in the 1970s 
was the result of the sharp slowdown  of productivity growth from the 
extraordinary heights of the economic  miracle to the sluggish  rates that 
have prevailed since  1974. After that fateful year, accumulated wealth, 
which  had been barely able (in some  countries,  unable) to keep pace 
with productivity,  began to rise to a new level  relative to productivity. 
And that gradual accumulation of wealth relative to the wage rates that 
employers  could  afford  put mounting  upward pressure  on  the  wage 
curve,  and thus drove up the natural rate. Furthermore, the prospect of 
slower  growth  in  employee  productivity  lowers  the  "marginal  effi- 
ciency"  of hiring,  thus reducing demand for labor 
The  "labor  supply"  shifts-that  is,  computed  shifts  of  the  wage 
curve-that  Blanchard calculates occurred in the 1970s (see table 3 and 
figure 5)  appear to corroborate the tenets  of  the consensus  described 
above.  In most  cases,  the computed  adverse  shift  of  the wage  curve 
was quite large.  Where it was small-the  United States,  Canada, Ire- 
land, and Italy-the  productivity slowdown  was slight and the welfare 
state was relatively  narrow, focused  on old people and young mothers. 
The finding that much of the shift was later given  back may be due to 
a  decumulation  of  wealth,  following  the  decline  of  after-tax  wages 
brought by tax increases,  and, in some countries, to the eventual scaling 
back of entitlements. 
The consensus  on unemployment  adds two shocks to labor demand 
in  the  1980s.  Without  these  shocks,  as  Blanchard notes,  the  theory 
would  imply  a full,  or at least  substantial,  recovery  after the  1970s. 
One  shock,  the huge  rise  in the early  1980s  in the average  expected 
long-term world real interest rate, which remains somewhat elevated to 
this  day,  immediately  reduced  labor demand  through two  channels. 
First, the higher cost of capital dampens the willingness  of employers 
to invest  in either new employees  (so they hire fewer of them) or new 
customers (so they stop keeping their markup low,  and thus the product 
wage  that they  are willing  to pay is  reduced).  Consequently,  labor's 
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employees  and customers,  and the natural rate is driven up.  One can 
call  this  markup increase,  such  as  Blanchard  talks  about,  but I  am 
talking about markup increases that are induced by the elevation  of real 
interest  rates.  Second,  there  is  obviously  a physical  capital  channel 
from real interest rates to labor demand, which may operate only very 
gradually. 
The  other  suspect  shock  is  hard to  get  a handle  on,  although  the 
paper makes  some  strides toward doing  so.  This  shock  is the new  or 
intensified  labor-saving  bias in technical  change that set in around the 
end of  the  1970s.  A  slowdown  of  the marginal productivity  of  labor 
coupled with a speed-up of the marginal productivity of capital (relative 
to the old bias of technical  progress) that leaves  growth in total factor 
productivity  unchanged  will  slow  labor demand at any given  capital 
stock,  but at first the wage  curve  will  not slow  in tandem.  Thus the 
natural rate will  be gradually pushed up. 
In Blanchard's computations,  the labor demand shifts from 1981 are 
indeed adverse in almost all of the OECD countries studied,  and they 
are fairly  large.  (Interestingly,  for reasons  that I do  not understand, 
there tend to be some positive  labor demand shifts in the 1970s; so,  the 
net change is even larger.) I am very pleased to see that the consensus 
view,  into which I have put a lot of effort,  comes  out quite well  here. 
Nevertheless,  in places Blanchard seems to want to cast doubt on some 
of these ideas. 
In regard to the real interest rate hypothesis,  in figure 9 Blanchard 
uses a time series for France that depicts the real rate as having by 1986 
returned all the way  to its low  levels  of  the late  1970s.  If those  data 
were correct, the rise of real rates would be short-lived  and one could 
hardly ascribe any durable part of the rise of unemployment from 1980 
onward  to  real  interest  rates.  I think  this  peculiar  series  ("bonds, 
method  1")  is the result of Blanchard weighing  distant inflation rates, 
including the very high rates around 1980-82,  as heavily as more recent 
ones  when calculating  the real interest rate from the nominal  interest 
rate. (Lest there should be any doubt about the apparent importance of 
the real rate, if one juxtaposes  the graph of the evolution  of the unem- 
ployment rate in the United Kingdom and that of the world real interest 
rate from the  1960s  to recent times,  it is difficult  not to be impressed 
by the fit.) 
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of adjustment costs smoothing out expansions and contractions in firms' 
workforces.  He leaves  the impression  that this mechanism  is capable 
of providing a new basis for the wage curve. The idea seems to be that 
whenever  new  workers are hired,  managers and their employees  have 
to learn how best to divide their labor and the bits and pieces  of capital 
among the workers.  So,  there is some marginal adjustment cost when 
new  workers  are hired and,  very  plausibly,  the  marginal adjustment 
cost per new hire is greater the faster the rate of hiring. There is also a 
marginal adjustment cost  of  downsizing,  which  also  makes sense,  as 
the employees  that survive  the cuts have to learn how best to use the 
bits and pieces  released  by the employees  who have been let go.  But 
this story does not generate incentive  wages  above the market-clearing 
level,  nor, as a corollary,  involuntary unemployment.  (For example,  in 
this model no expensive  learning or training is involved  in replacing a 
worker who has quit; the replacement  worker will  immediately  be up 
and running,  slotted  in at no cost  among  the bits  and pieces  already 
optimally set up. So, the employer does not need to pay incentive wages 
to dampen quitting.)  Thus the wage  curve is  left  unfounded.  In fact, 
even  the terms "wage  curve"  and "incentive  wage"  are missing. 
My comments  so far have been quibbles.  But there are more serious 
problems  in the paper: its results,  and thus the thrust of  its message, 
are seriously  misleading  in certain respects.  One of the problems stems 
from the entirely  aggregate  analysis  of  unemployment.  The paper re- 
ports that in the Anglo-Saxon  countries, the unemployment rate by 1996 
had returned to its level  in the early  1970s,  or fairly close  to that.  It 
would  seem  that there has been  full  or substantial recovery  from the 
"great  slump"  of  the  1980s.  (And in those  countries,  capital's  share 
in the business  sector is reported to have subsided in the  1990s to the 
levels  of  the  early  1970s.)  But  one  knows  that within  categories  of 
educational  attainment-high  school  dropouts,  high school  graduates 
only,  some  college,  and college  graduates-unemployment  rates gen- 
erally  have  risen,  except  in the top group.  In the United  States,  for 
example,  the  unemployment  rate for adult men  in the bottom  group 
rose from about 5 percent in the early 1970s to the neighborhood of  11 
percent  in  1996.  How  can it be  that the average  unemployment  rate 
recovered  while  almost  all  within-group  rates increased?  Part of  the 
answer,  my research suggests,  is that the low paid-especially  men- 
have been leaving the labor force in huge numbers. Another part of the Olivier  J. Blanchard  153 
answer is substantial movement  up the educational  ladder. Fewer and 
fewer  workers have  left  education  before  receiving  a high  school  di- 
ploma,  and fewer and fewer spent no time in college. 
In principle,  one way to allow  for this phenomenon  in the analysis 
would  be  to  work  with  a fixed-weight  index  of  unemployment  rates 
constructed from within-group wage rates (and likewise,  a fixed-weight 
index of wage rates).  For both the United States and the United King- 
dom,  such an unemployment  index will  show a far larger rise over the 
past twenty-five  years than does  the measured average unemployment 
rate: an additional increase of about 2 percentage points in the United 
States and about 1.5 percentage points in the United Kingdom,  accord- 
ing to research with Gylfi Zoega. I And the index of within-group hourly 
compensation  will  show  a far smaller rise in the United Kingdom and 
a far greater fall in the United States than does average hourly compen- 
sation.  But to write a paper parallel to this using these indexes  would 
require an index of within-group output per manhour, and such data do 
not exist. 
Another  way  of  proceeding  would  be  to  look  at the  evolution  of 
unemployment  and wage  rates in a particular educational  group.  But 
likewise,  one  could  not  expect  Blanchard  to  determine  whether  the 
unemployment of dropouts, for example,  has soared because they have 
priced themselves  out of the market or because they have suffered from 
reduced demand as a result of higher markups or increased labor-saving 
bias  in technological  change,  since  there do not exist  the output and 
capital series for high school  dropout workers that his type of calcula- 
tion would require. 
There is one final problem with the paper. The recovery and subse- 
quent swelling  of  capital's  share in the  1980s  among the Continental 
countries  are presented  in the paper as strong evidence  for the thesis 
that markup increases-perhaps  prompted by  the elevation  of  world 
real interest rates, or a shift toward more labor-saving  technology,  or 
some  combination  of  both-are  major forces  behind  the  rise  of  the 
natural rate of unemployment  in Europe since  1980.  But the failure of 
capital's  share to show a cumulative rise in the Anglo-Saxon  countries 
encourages  the inference that if the rise in world real interest rates did 
not push up capital's  share in the United  States and the United  King- 
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dom,  it did not push up the unemployment  rate in those countries-or 
in continental  Europe either.  Similarly,  if global technological  change 
did not develop  a new labor-saving bias that changed capital's  share in 
the  United  States  and the  United  Kingdom,  then  it did  not push  up 
unemployment there-or  in continental Europe. Since I believe  that the 
world  real  interest  rate is  a very  consequential  factor  in  the  United 
States,  and I also  incline  toward the view  that a new or increased bias 
in technological  change  is  also  a factor throughout the West,  I need 
now to deal with these bothersome facts. 
First,  a rise  in capital's  share is  no smoking  gun and it would  not 
necessarily  be  visible-or  visible  forever-after  an  increase  in  the 
world  real  interest  rate.  In  Blanchard's  model,  for  example,  where 
profits are a return only on physical  capital,  a permanent rise in capital 
share would result from the rise of the real rate of  interest only  if the 
substitution elasticity  was less than one.  And it could very well be that 
most Continental countries have a much lower elasticity  of substitution 
than does  the United  States.  The paper's estimates  of the substitution 
elasticity  are all over the place,  ranging from 3.45  in the Netherlands 
to 0.48  in Italy.  Furthermore, it is clear that after world real interest 
rates rose in 1981, the profit share stopped falling and strongly reversed 
direction,  even  if it did not ultimately post a very large net cumulative 
rise since  1970. 
Second,  capital's  share is not driven by one factor alone.  It is subject 
to many influences,  certainly to those of the real exchange  rate as well 
as the world real interest rate. Currencies were weak in Europe relative 
to the dollar in the 1980s and they are somewhat weak again in the late 
1990s.  A strong dollar operates to reduce the markups set by U.S.  firms 
that produce tradables.  So,  the fact that capital's  share is not booming 
in the United States as it is in continental Europe is not cause to reject 
the hypothesis  that the elevation  of real interest rates has contributed to 
the unemployment  problem. 
Third, I suspect that the huge shift in the educational composition  of 
the labor force plays  a role here too.  Suppose  that the thinning out of 
workers on the lower  rungs of  the educational  ladder has a beneficial 
effect on quit rates, absenteeism,  shirking, and so forth. Such an effect, 
in turn, must operate to narrow the margins between price and unit cost 
that are needed to cover turnover training outlays in replacing workers 
who quit and the costs  of monitoring and supervising workers who are Olivier J. Blanchard  155 
otherwise  likely  to lie down on the job or worse.  Thus on this account, 
the educational  broadening  in the American  and British labor forces, 
taken alone,  must have  raised  labor's  share and lowered  the  natural 
rate. This development  was not so strong in the Continental countries; 
in Italy,  for example,  the differentials  in unemployment  rates between 
educational  groups are not so pronounced,  or even go the wrong way. 
It may also be true that desk jobs do not need as much physical  capital 
per worker as do production line jobs. 
Fourth, the greater number of American workers with some educa- 
tional credentials certainly increases the wage bill in the economy,  since 
the employer will pay these an educated worker's wage on the prospect 
of recovering  the cost  when their wider knowledge  and greater versa- 
tility are needed. But the eventual payoff from their greater "promise," 
which  justifies  the  wage  premium,  may  be  a  long  time  in  coming. 
Although wages go up, productivity may increase only much later, after 
the introduction of a new technology,  a reorganization of the workforce, 
or entry into a new market-that  is,  when the workers' knowledge  and 
versatility  are really needed.  On this account,  then,  labor's share may 
grow for some time,  as the fraction of the labor force that is paid on its 
promise keeps  rising.  The fact that capital's  share does  not rise in the 
United  States  and the United  Kingdom  therefore is not evidence  that 
the influence  of world real interest rates on capitals  share is absent or 
weak. 
To  conclude,  I  do  find  this  paper quite  stimulating.  In  the  end, 
though,  it leaves  me wiser but in the same place. 
General  discussion:  Robert Gordon was doubtful of Phelps's  view that 
the reduction  of  the U.S.  unemployment  rate in recent years  largely 
reflects a change in the relative importance of educational groups,  and 
that the aggregate rate masks a substantial increase in unemployment, 
controlling  for education.  He asserted that it would require an implau- 
sibly  large compositional  change  to explain  the fall  in the unemploy- 
ment rate, and argued that if Phelps were correct, productivity  should 
have  risen  by a corresponding  amount,  which  it has not.  Gordon re- 
called a Brookings  conference  organized by Charles Schultze a decade 
ago that identified the minimum wage,  unemployment  insurance,  and 
other institutional  rigidities  as culprits of Europe's  high  levels  of  un- 
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tween the Continental and the Anglo-Saxon  experiences.  Both sets of 
countries have been exposed  to globalization  and shifts of technology, 
but the labor market structure of the Continental countries has delivered 
lower  inequality  and  higher  unemployment.  He  also  suggested  that 
labor market differences  help to explain  why there are more low-wage 
workers in the United States, and hence why service sector productivity 
in the United  States is relatively  low.  With a plentiful  supply of low- 
cost workers,  firms have little incentive  to substitute capital for labor. 
Gordon cited anecdotal evidence  from Europe-the  absence of grocery 
baggers  in  stores,  busboys  in  restaurants,  and attendants in parking 
lots-that  accords  with  this explanation.  Nordhaus observed  that the 
huge difference  between  continental  Europe and the United  States in 
rent-seeking institutions in the labor market is another important reason 
for differences  in labor market reaction to shocks. 
N.  Gregory Mankiw believed  that the paper should have paid more 
attention to the possible  role of skill-biased technical change in explain- 
ing labor market performance.  Although  such change  may have been 
common across countries and may have caused a decline in the demand 
for  unskilled  workers  in  all  of  them,  the  effect  on  employment  and 
wages  should reflect the structural differences  emphasized by Gordon. 
In the  United  States,  unskilled  wages  have  gone  down,  whereas  the 
welfare  states  of  Europe  have  provided  a  higher  floor  to  unskilled 
wages.  As a result, European countries experience great unemployment 
and the United States experiences  increased inequality.  Mankiw noted 
that this explanation  relies  on only  a single  shift and one institutional 
difference,  instead  of  the  multiple  shifts  discussed  in  Blanchard's 
paper. 
Robert Hall  observed  that the different  experiences  of Europe and 
the  United  States  highlight  the  importance  of  different  theoretical 
models.  Search models,  which explain how workers who have lost jobs 
become reemployed,  are essential for understanding the U.S.  economy, 
whereas models explaining the determination of the efficiency  wage are 
essential  for understanding the Continental experience. Olivier J. Blanchard  157 
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